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INTRODUCTION
The debate over whether gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender1
people are born into their sexual orientation or nurtured into it has
continued for almost a century.2  The debate originally was confined
to the medical community, but recently has shifted to the political
sphere.3  Gay rights activists argue that sexual orientation is either an
immutable characteristic4 or an exercise in free will, and that there
                                                 
1. See Chai Feldblum, Sexual Orientation, Morality, and the Law:  Devlin Revisited,
57 U. PITT. L. REV. 237, 238 n.1 (1996) (providing a commonly used definition of
transgender).  Feldblum defines transgender as “those who desire to change their
gender, are in the process of changing their gender, or have completed the process
of changing their gender.”  Id.  Although the term transgender deals primarily with
gender identity and not sexual orientation, the term is included throughout this
Comment because many transgender youths are perceived to be gay, lesbian, or
bisexual because they do not fit the stereotypical characteristics of their gender.  As a
result, transgender youths are subjected to “reparative” therapy to “cure” their
perceived sexual orientation.
2. See Jack Drescher, I’m Your Handyman:  A History of Reparative Therapies, 36 J.
HOMOSEXUALITY 19, 21 (1998) (tracing the nature (immutability-biological)/nurture
(environment and choice) debate to Sigmund Freud’s writings on homosexuality,
which spanned a 20 year period beginning in 1905).  Drescher further explains that
Freud’s position is often “opaque,” and that taken out of the historical context,
Freud can be portrayed as “virulently anti-homosexual.”  See id.  When viewed in a
historical context, as done by Drescher, however, Freud is portrayed as tolerant for
his time toward homosexuals and more receptive to the “nature” side of the debate.
See id.
3. See id. at 19, 21 (noting that the debate began as early as 1905, when some
psychoanalytically-oriented practitioners such as Freud claimed that gay people were
trapped in a juvenile state).  The debate has since moved to anti-gay political
movements, thus illustrating the permeability of the boundaries between clinical and
political issues.  See id.  Drescher, however, notes that “Freud’s position on
homosexuality cannot be understood in the language of the contemporary debate
about homosexuality.”  Id. at 22-23.  “In fact, [Freud’s] original intent is sometimes
obscured when his opinions are brought to bear on the modern controversy.”  Id. at
23.
4. The immutability argument has been successful.  See, e.g., Watkins v. United
States Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir.) (holding that sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic for equal protection purposes), amended by 847 F.2d 1329
(9th Cir. 1988), reh’g granted, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert denied, 498
U.S. 957 (1990).  The Ninth Circuit interpreted the Supreme Court’s historical use
of the term “immutability” to determine whether a group constitutes a suspect class.
See id.  The Supreme Court has never intended strict immutability because no specific
characteristic that defines the group generally is consistent among individual
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need not be a consensus because all gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender citizens deserve equal rights in either instance.5  Others,
largely opponents to gay rights, argue that sexual orientation is
immoral and chosen, not biological;6 therefore, gay, lesbian, and
bisexual people do not deserve the same legal protections that other
“legitimate” minority groups enjoy.7
Recently this debate has taken on a new characteristic with the
                                                 
members of the group.  See Watkins, 847 F.2d at 1347.  For example, people can
change their sex, aliens can become citizens, and light-skinned blacks can sometimes
pass for whites.  See id.  Rather, the court concluded that a trait is immutable if
changing it would require great difficulty.  See id.
5. See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY 334 (1995) (outlining gay activists’
assertion that homosexuality is innate, such as when they cite studies on the
occurrence of homosexuality in identical and fraternal twins).  Vaid also argues that
this assertion radically limits the original reach of the political movement because, as
history has shown, “the shelter of biology has never protected a people from
persecution.”  See id.; see also Janet E. Halley, Sexual Orientation and the Politics of
Biology:  A Critique of the Argument from Immutability, 46 STAN. L. REV. 503, 506 (1994)
(stating that the pro-gay legal argument should steer a middle ground between
essentialism (biological immutability) and constructivism (choice and mutability),
toward legal strategies that emphasize political dynamics and avoid being seduced
into a debate over sexual identity and causation).
6. See John M. Finnis, Law, Morality, and “Sexual Orientation,” 69 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1049, 1054 (1994) (claiming that homosexuality is in manifest opposition to
moral beliefs and teachings, and stating that homosexual conduct is evil).
Furthermore, Finnis states that homosexuality is incompatible and counter to
marriage, that Platonic-Aristotelian philosophy rejects homosexual acts as
intrinsically unreasonable and unnatural, and that homosexual acts are similar to
masturbation.  See id. at 1062-63.  He also asserts that homosexual acts (presumably
referring to sodomy—an act not uniquely homosexual) are “unworthy of the human
being and immoral.”  See id.
7. See id. at 1070 (asserting that communities have a fundamental interest in
promoting heterosexual family lifestyles and discouraging gay lifestyles because
homosexuality is detrimental to the properly functioning family unit, which is the
foundation of the community).  One anti-gay activist has been quoted as stating that:
Homosexuals were not born that way.  They chose to be gay . . . and they
could influence young people to choose to be homosexual as well.  That was
why they wanted gay rights protections, so they could work at playgrounds
and public schools and recruit young people to their way of life.  They were
flagrant law breakers and now they want ‘special privileges’ of gay rights
guarantees.
VAID, supra note 5, at 332 (quoting Anita Bryant); see also Peter LaBarbera, Gay Youth
Suicide:  Myth is Used to Promote Homosexual Agenda, Insight (Family Research Council,
Washington, D.C.), Feb. 1994, at 8 (discussing homosexuality as a choice, not an
immutable characteristic, in a newsletter that attempts to discredit gay teen suicide
study).  The newsletter states:
A significant body of evidence exists that a sizeable percentage of men and
women experiment with homosexual acts in their youth but go on to lead
normal, heterosexual lives.  Such evidence is resisted by the gay lobby, which
increasingly argues that one’s homosexual ‘identity’ is fixed at birth or in
one’s very early years and cannot be changed.
Id. at 8 (emphasis omitted).  LaBarbera criticizes state programs, which, in his
estimation, push teenagers into homosexual lifestyles.  See id.  Massachusetts, for
example, adopted pro-gay programs that help teenagers accept their homosexuality
rather than promoting a heterosexual lifestyle.  See id.
508 AMERICAN UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 49:505
emergence of the “ex-gay” movement8 and “reparative”9 therapy.
This new “ex-gay” movement advocates that gay, lesbian, and bisexual
people can, and should, change their sexual orientation to that of
heterosexuality through prayer, sound Christian psychological
teachings, repentance, faith in Jesus Christ as Savior and Lord,10 and
therapy.11  The “ex-gay” movement has its roots in and financial
support from right-wing, Christian organizations.12  Although some
activists argue that this movement presents nothing more than the
                                                 
8. See John Leland & Mark Miller, Can Gays ‘Convert’?, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 17, 1998,
at 47 (declaring July 13, 1998, as the date the “ex-gay” ministries were no longer the
better-kept secret of the church because they began taking out full page ads in major
newspapers, claiming, “we’ve changed, so can you”); see also Jon Barrett, Hate the Sin,
Kill the Sinner:  The Lost Brother, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 24, 1998, at 26 (discussing how
the “ex-gay” campaign has led to anti-gay rhetoric and an increase in hate crimes—
ultimately leading to the brutal death of Matthew Shepard); Stuart Miller, It Didn’t
Work, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 24, 1998, at 43, 57 (discussing the author’s undercover
investigation of “ex-gay” ministries).  Miller makes it clear that the “ex-gay”
movement truly is an emergence; there are now more than 160 Christian-based
programs in 39 states and the District of Columbia aimed at “curing” homosexuals.
See id. at 57.
9. The word “reparative” will remain in quotation marks throughout this
Comment to make the point that it incorrectly presupposes that a gay, lesbian,
bisexual, or transgender identity is one that needs to be repaired.  Similarly, the word
“ex-gay” will remain in quotes because whether someone can actually be converted to
heterosexuality is highly debatable given the low success rate discussed below.
10. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 50 (noting that one psychologist in the
movement likened gays in “reparative” therapy to priests who have taken a vow of
celibacy); see also Surina Khan, Homosexual Healing, BOSTON MAG., July 1998, at 24
(finding that the basic premise of the “ex-gay” movement is that people are not born
homosexual because all people are made in the image of God, that God is
heterosexual, that God does not make mistakes and therefore, it is impossible to be
born gay; thus homosexuality must be a choice).  Khan further explains that the “ex-
gay” movement claims that to become a “whole person again,” gay persons must pray
to God to become the persons they were before they succumbed to their homosexual
feeling.  He also claims that they must either become heterosexual or abstain from
sexual activity.  See id.  Khan quotes a member of Exodus, an “ex-gay” ministry with 87
chapters in the United States and Canada, as saying that Exodus’ goal is “to proclaim
that freedom from homosexuality is possible through the power of Jesus Christ,” and
that “Exodus cites homosexual tendencies as one of the many disorders that has
beset fallen humanity.”  See id. at 27-28.
11. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 49 (naming the National Association for
Research and Therapy of Homosexuality (“NARTH”), headed by Joseph Nicolosi, as
the psychologically based branch of the “ex-gay” movement).  NARTH claims that
homosexuality is a disorder that can and should be treated.  See id.
12. See Towards Hope and Healing for Homosexuals, USA TODAY, July 15, 1998, at 4D
(displaying “ex-gay” ads paid for by Christian organizations, including Alliance for
Traditional Marriage-Hawaii, American Family Association, Christian Family
Network, Christian Coalition, Concerned Women for America, Coral Ridge
Ministries, Kerruso Ministries, Center for Reclaiming America, and Family Research
Council); see also Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 47 (noting that in the summer of
1998, Exodus International, a nondenominational Christian fellowship dedicated to
converting homosexuals, in conjunction with groups such as the Christian Coalition,
began taking out full-page ads in major newspapers to promote “reparative”
therapy).
1999] “REPARATIVE” THERAPY 509
latest in right-wing politics,13 neither the history14 nor the individuals
affected by the “ex-gay” movement should be ignored.15
For purposes of this Comment, the form of “reparative” therapy
under examination is that type imposed by parents on their minor
children in an attempt to change the child’s perceived sexual
orientation.  To avoid any legal ambiguity that may be presented
when adults consent to undergo this therapy, this Comment focuses
on children, specifically those subjected to “reparative” therapy
against their will.16
To ascertain whether a person’s sexual orientation is even capable
of being changed or repaired, this Comment begins with a brief
exploration of whether gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender
orientation comes from nature or nurture.  Part I of this Comment
looks at a sampling of the biological evidence that has been
introduced over time, specifically within the past two decades, that
links sexual orientation to biology.  Part I then focuses on what
opponents to these particular studies have argued to refute claims of
biological connections.  Although a claim that “reparative” therapy is
a form of child abuse or neglect is strongest if sexual orientation is
somehow biologically determined, this Part concludes that even if no
                                                 
13. See Calculated Compassion:  How the Ex-Gay Movement Serves the Right’s Attack on
Democracy, NGLTF Newsletter (Political Research Associates & The Policy Institute of
The National Gay and Lesbian Task Force, Washington, D.C.), Oct. 1998, at 1
[hereinafter Calculated Compassion] (claiming that the ad campaign by the Christian
Right organizations represents a re-framing of the same old message that
homosexuals do not deserve rights).  See generally Jim Maynard, Gays, Lesbians Live in
Secrecy and Fear, THE COMMERCIAL APPEAL, Jan. 31, 1999, at B5 (reporting that Janet
Folger, the architect of the “ex-gay” campaign, told The New York Times that the
purpose of the full page ads and the movement was “to strike at the assumption that
homosexuality is an immutable trait”).  The advertisements were also placed to
advocate that gay people do not need protection under anti-discrimination laws
because homosexuals can choose to abandon their minority status through
conversion, whereas other minorities cannot.  See id.
14. See Drescher, supra note 2, at 19 (discussing the evolution of the definition of
“reparative” therapist, from medically concerned practitioners to anti-gay political
activists); see also Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 48 (reporting that for more than a
century, the history of the “reparative” therapy movement involved drugs,
electroshock, and testicular transplants).  After the American Psychiatric and
Psychological Associations voted in the 1970s to no longer recognize homosexuality
as a disorder, however, most therapists abandoned sexual conversion practice.  See id.
15. See infra notes 42-46 & 55-58 and accompanying text (discussing the
psychological harm suffered by those who have been put through “reparative”
therapy and specifically the psychological problems of gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender youths who are not in supportive environments).
16. This Comment is also an attempt to further the goal of queer theory by
arguing that the inherent hetero/homo binary present in “reparative” therapy (i.e.,
that one must be either heterosexual or homosexual, preferably heterosexual)
should be troubled, deconstructed, and eroded.  See generally INSIDE/OUTSIDE 6
(Diana Fuss ed., 1991) (suggesting ways to disturb the hetero/homo binary and
heterosexual  hegemony without reinforcing them).
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ample evidence supports such a claim, “reparative” therapy on
children should still be considered abuse and neglect because of its
damaging effects.
Part II defines the practices of “reparative” therapy and discusses
both the methodology and results it entails, focusing on gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender youths.  Part III analyzes case law and child
abuse and neglect statutes, focusing specifically on the State of New
York.  This Part explores the New York state courts’ movement
toward recognizing psychological harm as a form of child abuse that
is as damaging as physical abuse and neglect.  Part IV compares the
methodology used in “reparative” therapy to child abuse and neglect
cases in New York and concludes that “reparative” therapy on
children constitutes child abuse.  Part IV then argues that
“reparative” therapy can, and should, be legislatively and judicially
recognized as a form of child abuse and neglect.  Part IV also
anticipates that parents who seek to place their children in
“reparative” therapy will raise two defenses to a charge of abuse:  a
First Amendment free exercise of religion claim and a Fourteenth
Amendment liberty interest claim of parental autonomy in raising
their children.  This Part then weighs the state’s interest in raising
psychologically sound and productive citizens, regardless of their
sexual orientation, with parents’ rights to raise their children as they
see fit.
This Comment concludes that although “reparative” therapy could
be legislatively interpreted and judicially determined to constitute
child abuse, the likelihood of such an act to protect gay, lesbian,
bisexual and transgender children is unlikely.  Finally, this Comment
recommends that the judiciary interpret the child abuse statutes and
case law to apply to “reparative” therapy to protect gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender youths from its damaging effects.  This
Comment also suggests a means through which the gay liberation
movement can facilitate this legal extension.
I. THE NATURE V. NURTURE DEBATE ON SEXUAL ORIENTATION
The case for or against biological evidence of sexual orientation
has at least two sides.17  In 1991, scientist Simon LeVay found
evidence of a biological origin for sexual orientation in the human
brain.18  LeVay discovered that the hypothalamus19 of gay men was
                                                 
17. See infra notes 19-33.
18. See Simon LeVay, A Difference in Hypothalamic Structure Between Heterosexual and
Homosexual Men, 253 SCIENCE 1034, 1035 (1991) (finding that homosexual males
have smaller hypothalamus glands than heterosexual males and hypothesizing that
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smaller than that of heterosexual men.20  In addition, studies
conducted on twins show that in identical male twins, fifty-two
percent are both homosexual, whereas only twenty-two percent of
male fraternal twins are both homosexual.21  In non-biological
families, this study found only an eleven percent correlation in
adopted brothers, which is closest to that in the general population.22
Similarly, a recent study found that heterosexual women tend to have
index and ring fingers that are the same length whereas lesbians tend
to have index fingers that are shorter than their ring fingers.23  These
studies represent strong support for the argument that homosexuality
is determined genetically or biologically.24
To refute these conclusions, other scientists have questioned the
very premise of these studies.25  For example, geneticist Anne Fausto-
Sterling pointed out that LeVay’s study rested on the central
assumption that sexual dimorphism exists in the human brain.26
Fausto-Sterling claims that the dimorphism finding has not only been
                                                 
the difference in gland size controls sexual orientation); see also CHANDLER BURR, A
SEPARATE CREATION:  THE SEARCH FOR BIOLOGICAL ORIGINS OF SEXUAL ORIENTATION 21
(1996) (outlining the scientific debate on sexual orientation and examining
criticisms of recent studies, such as LeVay’s, postulating that homosexuality is
genetic).
19. See WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY 325 (3d ed. 1993) (defining hypothalamus as “a
region of the brain that regulates visceral functions, as sleep cycles”).
20. See LeVay, supra note 18, at 1036 (studying 41 brains during routine autopsies
to measure the hypothalamus gland and discovering that the gland was smaller in
individuals sexually attracted to men, both heterosexual females and homosexual
men); see also BURR, supra note 18, at 21 (noting that LeVay’s discovery sent shock
waves through the scientific community).
21. See J. Michael Bailey & Richard Pillard, A Genetic Study of Male Sexual
Orientation, 48 ARCHIVES OF GEN. PSYCHIATRY 1089, 1090 (1991) (examining the
instances of similar genetic traits in fraternal and identical twins and ultimately
concluding that homosexuality is at least partially determined genetically).  This
study found that identical twins who share exactly the same genes are twice as likely
to share homosexual traits and homosexual orientation as fraternal twins who only
share half of their genes.  See id. at 1094.
22. Consequently, the study determines the difference to be genetic, not
environmental.  See id.
23. See A Clue To Sexual Orientation, WASH. POST, Apr. 3, 2000, at A07
(summarizing a recent study on biological origins or sexual orientation).
24. See BURR, supra note 18, at 36 (“From all this evidence scientists have
conclusively decided:  homosexuality is biological.”).
25. See id. at 36 (reporting that not all scientists are convinced that homosexuality
is genetic and that some attack LeVay’s methodology which, they claim, distorts his
ultimate conclusion).
26. See id. at 42 (highlighting the disagreement between LeVay and Fausto-
Sterling, a developmental geneticist, regarding their differing opinions on the
origins of sexual orientation).  Burr reports that Fausto-Sterling believes that merely
because the hypothalamus gland is smaller in homosexual men and heterosexual
women does not necessarily mean that the size of the actual gland is determinative of
sexual orientation.  See id.  Fausto-Sterling also points out that assertions that the size
of the hypothalamus gland determines one’s sex drive have already been refuted.  See
id.
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refuted, but that the doctrine is questionable because its roots are in
the “well-known” theory that Caucasians are mentally superior to
other races.27  Similarly, others argue that the brain samples LeVay
used were from men who had died of AIDS-related complications;
therefore, the medication and the effects of the disease may have
altered the body chemistry and consequently, the hypothalamus.28
Furthermore, those who refuted the twin studies pointed out that the
identical twins were raised in the same environment, and that they
were often treated similarly, right down to the way they were
dressed.29  Accordingly, those who refute the biological side of the
debate believe that the twin study provides as much support for the
nurture side of the debate as it does for the nature side.30
With both sides of the debate strongly supported, it is impossible to
make an impartial decision on whether gay, lesbian, bisexual, or
transgender orientation is the product of nature or nurture.31  Due to
                                                 
27. See id.  Fausto-Sterling attacks LeVay’s study at its most basic assumption:  that
sexual orientation can be pinpointed to a particular part of the human brain.  See id.
As an example of how scientists can be fooled into believing sexuality is controlled by
one particular part of the brain, Fausto-Sterling cites E.A. Spitzka’s 1908 study
comparing the brains of eminent scientists with white and black laborers and
concluding that great men (the scientists) had larger corpora callosas.  See id.  Burr
also cites Evan Balaban, a Harvard biologist who rejected LeVay’s hypothalamus
study because the dye used on the brain tissue was unreliable; it is known to fluctuate
seasonally in studies done on particular types of birds.  See id. at 37.  Balaban also
claims that it is hard to know exactly what one is observing when looking at a group
of brain cells.  See id. at 38.  He further states that even if there is a difference in these
particular cells, there is no indication that these cells control a person’s sexual
orientation.  See id.
28. See id. at 47 (noting Bill Byne’s rejection of LeVay’s methodology and
pointing out that the environment was not controlled, and that those who were in
the study were volunteers and not from random sampling, which is indicative of
unreliable data).  The Family Research Council, a right-wing think tank, often
employs Bill Byne to refute any claims of biological origin for sexual orientation.  See
id. at 49.  This fact further supports the argument of the permeability of the
boundaries between politics and clinical issues.  See supra note 3.
29. See id. at 47 (maintaining that the twin study has been interpreted to
demonstrate that homosexuality is not purely genetic).  Burr goes on to note that
some argue that because twins are 100% genetically identical, their sexual
orientation should be identical as well; yet only 50% had identical sexual orientation.
See id.
30. See id. at 48 (“The studies are said to ‘prove’ something one way or another
about homosexuality.  And these comments reflect a common misconception of
science:  that science ‘proves’ things . . . .”).
31. See id. at 50 (discussing the conflict between Bill Bayne and Dr. Lauren
Allen).  Dr. Allen testified in the trial concerning Colorado’s Amendment 2 in Romer
v. Evans, 882 P.2d 1335, 1346 (Colo. 1994), aff’d, 517 U.S. 620 (1996), in support of
LeVay’s study; Bill Byne testified against the LeVay study.  See BURR, supra note 18, at
50.  The case as a whole is considered a victory by gay rights activists, but the court
did not decide the nature/nurture debate.  See id.  But see Watkins v. United States
Army, 837 F.2d 1428, 1446 (9th Cir.) (finding that sexual orientation is an
immutable characteristic i.e., biological), amended by 847 F.2d 1329 (9th Cir. 1988),
reh’g granted, 875 F.2d 699 (9th Cir. 1989) (en banc), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 957 (1990).
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the difficulty of making this decision, this Comment does not take a
position on the debate, but rather points out that regardless of the
“correct” answer, “reparative” therapy is psychologically damaging
and should not be administered on gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people, and especially not on children.32
II. “REPARATIVE” THERAPY:  IS IT PSYCHOLOGICALLY DAMAGING TO
GAY, LESBIAN, BISEXUAL, AND TRANSGENDER YOUTHS?
A. What is “Reparative” Therapy?
“Reparative” therapy, a program of psychotherapy, attempts to
“cure” homosexuals by turning them into heterosexuals.33  Both the
American Psychoanalytic Association and the American Psychiatric
Association have expressed their opposition to “reparative” therapy.34
At the 105th annual meeting in Chicago on August 14, 1997, the
American Psychological Association announced:
[T]he APA opposes all portrayals of lesbian, gay and bisexual
people as mentally ill and in need of treatment due to their sexual
orientation and supports the dissemination of accurate
information about sexual orientation, and mental health, and
appropriate interventions in order to counteract bias that is based
in ignorance and unfounded beliefs about sexual orientation.35
In addition, the APA maintains that scientific evidence does not
                                                 
32. See infra Part III (discussing the damaging effects of “reparative” therapy).
33. See Drescher, supra note 2, at 19, 20 (noting that “reparative” therapy is
generally defined as “to change an individual’s homosexual orientation to a
heterosexual one,” and attributing the coining of the term “reparative” therapy to
Joseph Nicolsi from his book REPARATIVE THERAPY OF THE MALE HOMOSEXUAL:  A NEW
CLINICAL APPROACH (1991)); see also Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 49 (asserting
that Nicolosi is the foremost expert on “reparative” therapy).
34. See Barry Yeoman, Gay No More?, PSYCHOL. TODAY, Mar.-Apr. 1999, at 29
(indicating that in December 1998, the American Psychiatric Association’s board
unanimously voted to oppose “reparative” or conversion therapy).  The American
Psychiatric Association’s decision was based on the belief that these therapies
reinforce self-hatred and could lead to depression, addiction, and even suicide.  See
id.  The American Psychoanalytic Association, which was once in favor of attempts to
“cure” homosexuality, has distanced itself from endorsing “reparative” therapy,
calling homosexuality a “variant of normal sexuality.”  Id.  See generally John McCoy,
Workshop Canceled on Gay, Lesbian Youths:  Mesquite Superintendent Halted Training for
Middles School Counselors After Protests, DALLAS MORNING NEWS, Feb. 21, 1999, at 35A
(reporting that both the American Psychological Association (“APA”) and the
American Psychiatric Association have denounced “reparative” therapy as unethical
and potentially harmful).
35. American Psychological Association Council of Representatives, Resolution on
Appropriate Therapeutic Responses to Sexual Orientation (last modified Aug. 14, 1997)
<http://www.apa.org/pi/sexual.html> [hereinafter APA Resolution] (urging all
mental health professionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness
that has been associated with homosexuality).
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show that “reparative” or conversion therapy works.36
The American Academy of Pediatrics believes that therapy
“directed at specifically changing sexual orientation . . . can provoke
guilt and anxiety while having little or no potential for achieving
changes in orientation.”37  Further, the president of the American
Psychological Association’s Society for the Study of Lesbian, Gay, and
Bisexual Issues stated:  “Our concern is that a person, especially a
young person, who enters into therapy to deal with issues of sexual
orientation should be able to have the expectation that such therapy
would take place in a professionally neutral environment absent any
societal bias.”38  Although mainstream medical communities continue
to stress the negative consequences of “reparative” therapy, “ex-gay”
                                                 
36. See APA Passes Resolution on Homosexuality Conversion Therapy (American
Psychological Association) (Special Issue:  Report from the 105th Annual Meeting of the
American Psychological Association), BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TREATMENT, Sept. 1, 1997, at 5,
available in 1999 WL 9955704 [hereinafter BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TREATMENT]
(reporting on the APA’s denouncement of conversion therapy).  The article further
states:
Members agreed that conversion therapies have not been proven effective,
and they prey on prejudice and ignorance about sexual orientation.
Supporters of the resolution, approved by the APA’s Council of
Representatives by an overwhelming margin, argued that it was critical for
the APA to make such a statement due to questions of ethics, efficacy, and
benefits of conversion therapy.
Id.  But cf. Robert Knight, Longtime Foe of Normalizing Homosexuality Shines in “A Freedom
Too Far” (visited Mar. 13, 1999) <http://www.episcopalian.org/CCLEC/
bookreview-socarides.htm> (book review) (reviewing CHARLES SOCARIDES,
HOMOSEXUALITY:  A FREEDOM TOO FAR (1995)) (opposing what is seen as pro-gay
activism leading to the APA’s denouncement of “reparative” therapy).  Knight
honors Charles Socarides by recounting the events that occurred in 1973 when the
APA took homosexuality out of the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of Mental
Disorders (“DSM”).  See id.  Knight claims Socarides and a “small band of fellow
therapists stood in the breach as homosexual activists made their bid to commandeer
the APA.”  Id.  Knight further claims that  Socarides’ group was armed with “truth,
common sense, and decades of well-documented therapeutic research and clinical
experience,” and the homosexual activists had no scientific backing, but prevailed
based on “political savvy.”  See id.  Knight goes on to say that since 1973, homosexuals
have taken over “the major professional psychiatric and psychological associations,”
and, as a result, the “gay is good” philosophy permeates society in a “media-led
campaign to force Americans to accept homosexuality as normal.”  Id.
37. Kim I. Mills, Mission Impossible:  Why Reparative Therapy and Ex-Gay Ministries
Fail HRC Newsletter (Human Rights Campaign, Washington, D.C.), Aug. 1998, at 4
[hereinafter Mission Impossible] (citing a policy statement from the American
Academy of Pediatrics entitled “Homosexuality and Adolescence,” published in the
JOURNAL OF PEDIATRICS (Oct. 1993)).  The study notes that although confusion about
sexual orientation is not unusual during adolescence, and that counseling may be
helpful to clarify sexual orientation, psychological problems in homosexual
adolescents are primarily caused by societal stigma, hostility, hatred, and isolation.
See id.  These factors may help explain why homosexuals account for 30% of all
adolescent suicides.  See id.
38. BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TREATMENT, supra note 36, at 5 (emphasis added)
(noting that no study can conclusively prove that “reparative” therapy works,
however, because the therapy assumes homosexuality is a disorder; therefore,
practitioners begin with an “unacceptable bias”).
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ministries and certain psychologists continue to persuade clients that
they need to change their sexual orientation.39
Those who have gone through “reparative” therapy and have been
involved in “ex-gay” ministries speak of the medically unsound
methods employed by these therapists and organizations, such as
behavioral therapy, electrical shock therapy, chemical aversive
therapy, drug and hormone therapy, surgery, and psychotherapy.40
Other accounts are similar and include homophobic counseling,
religious propaganda, isolation, unnecessary medication (including
hormone treatment), subliminal therapies designed to inculcate
“feminine” or “masculine” behavior, and “covert desensitization”
therapies that teach a young person to associate homosexual feelings
with disgusting images.41  These forms of “treatment” frequently
result in nervous breakdowns and feelings of guilt; some patients
have witnessed others in their programs commit suicide and mutilate
their genitals.42  Many “reparative” therapy tactics are likely to cause
mental breakdowns in otherwise healthy gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender persons.43
                                                 
39. See infra notes 40-53 (discussing methods used to convince clients to change
their sexual orientation).  See generally Khan, supra note 10, at 27 (discussing
compelling speakers, like Joe Dallas, who promote “reparative” therapy as a way to
return an individual to the person they originally were before homosexual feelings
began).
40. See Rev. Laurene Lafontaine, Understanding “Ex-Gay” Christian Ministries, THE
EQUALITY TIMES, at 3 (providing an overview and critique of the techniques used by
the “ex-gay” ministries and “reparative” therapy from a Christian perspective).
Lafontaine not only lists techniques used in “reparative” therapy, but states that they
are not effective in changing sexual orientation.  See id.; see also Bruce Mirken, Setting
Them Straight, 10 PERCENT, June 1994, at 55 (reporting an account where a
plethysmography, which uses electric sensors attached to a person’s genitals to
measure sexual arousal, was used, in conjunction with shock therapy, to electrically
shock the “patient’s” penis when he became sexually aroused by same-sex images).
Mirken also discusses other victims’ experiences at a residential treatment center for
troubled adolescents, such as sedation, isolation, physical restraints, hypnosis, and
“hold therapy,” in which a girl was held down while staff members screamed at her
until she admitted that she was hurting her family by being a lesbian.  See id. at 56.
41. See Project to Stop Mental Health Abuse of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual, and Transgender
Youth, NCLR NEWSLETTER (National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, Cal.),
May 1994, at 6.
42. See Mission Impossible, supra note 37, at 8 (discussing testimony from Michael
Bussee, co-founder of Exodus, at the gathering “Ex-Gay Ministries Founders Recant,”
regarding how one member of his group slashed his genitals with a razor blade and
poured Drano on his wounds as a result of the psychological abuse) (citation
omitted); cf. Bill Schafer, Is Reparative Therapy Murder?, THE BUGLE, Aug. 1998, at 18
(reporting that the Community Counseling Center’s Executive Director, Ron
Lawrence, is looking for ex-“ex-gays” who have experienced some of these techniques
and are strong enough to bring a law suit against “ex-gay” ministries).  Lawrence
claims that his clients who have been through “reparative” therapy exhibit symptoms
of post-traumatic stress syndrome.  See id.
43. See Mission Impossible, supra note 37, at 8-9 (determining that although a
person’s behavior can be changed, her sexual orientation will not be altered).
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Kidnapping gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths and
taking them to in-patient centers by transportation or escort services
has emerged as another un-therapeutic “reparative” therapy
technique.44  Kidnapping can inflict profound trauma and emotional
damage resulting in post-traumatic stress syndrome.45  A number of
cases that involved kidnappings have resulted in physical abuse,
ranging from restraints and handcuffs that cause bruises to bloody
beatings and hair pulling.46
Similarly, members of some groups have gone to gay and lesbian
bars47 to “recruit” unsuspecting victims.48  Members of Exodus, one of
the largest “ex-gay” groups, have led victims to believe that they were
developing relationships while attempting, by use of emotional abuse
and “ministering,” to convince the victim that he or she should
                                                 
Compare supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text (detailing the mentally unhealthy
tactics; specifically, isolation, unnecessary mediation, electric shock, and chemical
aversion therapy), with supra notes 34-37 and accompanying text (stating a
professional position on how psychiatrists and mental health professionals should
counsel gay patients).
44. See Letter from Karen Jones-Mason, Director of Legal Services for Children,
to Shannon Minter, Staff Attorney at National Center for Lesbian Rights (Feb. 6,
1998) (on file with the American University Law Review) [hereinafter Letter]
(describing how Exodus’ escort service is unsafe and illustrating the psychological
effect kidnapping has on children).
45. See Schafer, supra note 42, at 18 (discussing that some people who underwent
reparative therapy suffer from post-traumatic stress syndrome); Letter, supra note 44
(asserting that the tactics employed by parents attempting to kidnap their own
children to place them in behavior modification camps is nothing short of
outrageous, resulting in emotional abuse of the youth; concluding that when
children are kidnapped and sent to abusive camps, it is possible to criminally
prosecute the parents).  The letter reveals that to capture gay youth, kidnappers have
resorted to such tactics as impersonating relatives and school officials and grabbing
youths off the street.  See id.  Although these tactics are not uncommon in the child
welfare system, the letter postulates that they should be treated as abuse when used
to facilitate “reparative” therapy because treatment for homosexuality is neither
medically sound nor accepted by the mainstream medical community; therefore,
such kidnapping is not in the best interest of the child.  See id.; see also APA Resolution,
supra note 35 and accompanying text (explaining APA’s position on “reparative”
therapy).
46. See Letter, supra note 44 (discussing kidnapping and behavior modification
camps and stating that “a number [of] cases have arisen where children were
handcuffed, beaten, pulled by the hair, bloodied, and emotionally battered by such
kidnapping”).  The author notes the case of one lesbian, Lynn Duff, who was sent to
a camp to “cure” her of homosexuality.  Duff was subjected to “multiple psychotropic
drugs and subconscious conditioning to convince her that she was ‘sick.’”  See id.
47. Although children will not be subjected to these methods of “conversion”
because they are unlikely to be in bars, this section of the Comment is thoroughly
examining methods used by the “ex-gay” ministries and “reparative” therapists.
48. See Shannon Turner & Surina Khan, Saving Us From Sin, CURVE, Nov. 1997, at
22 (describing how an Exodus member would recruit lesbians by going to lesbian
bars or hangouts posing as a lesbian, flirting with women, exchanging phone
numbers, and eventually having sex with women all in the name of getting close to
lesbians to convert them to heterosexuality).
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become heterosexual.49  These tactics have left victims feeling
paranoid and unable to trust anyone.50  Some of the most subtle and
almost comical tactics these groups employ include having the men
play basketball and football, and having the women learn how to
manicure their fingernails and wear makeup.51  One of the most
interesting tactics involves placing the two genders together in a
“misogyny training course” and having the women apologize to the
men for the feminist movement because it has “created so many
unattractive women that, of course, gay men would turn away from
them.”52
B. The Effects of “Reparative” Therapy on Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and
Transgender Youths
Attempting to convert gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
youths is even more dangerous than attempting to convert adults.53
Gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths are more likely than
adults to face tremendous social pressures to deny or reject their
feelings, actions, and thoughts.54  Likewise, gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender youths are more likely than their heterosexual
                                                 
49. See id.  One woman recalled how her one-time “girlfriend,” who was a
member of Exodus, began the conversion process by making subtle homophobic
comments such as “a man would really appreciate your body better than a woman
could.”  See id.  This escalated into Exodus attempting to bribe her into becoming
heterosexual by offering her money and a better job and threatening to sabotage her
career if she did not cooperate.  See id. at 23.  Exodus told her that she had no idea
how well-connected Exodus was in her town (Topeka, Kansas) and that she would
not be able to get a job if she did not become straight.  See id.
50. See id. at 23 (recounting how a former victim of Exodus feared that the
authors of the article, who were interviewing her for an article in a lesbian magazine,
were simply posing as lesbians and were going to “use all this information and turn it
against me somehow or use it in a Christian Coalition video or something”).
51. See Lawrence Ferber, When Art Imitates Life, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 24, 1998, at
63 (describing experiences of a gay actor and writer who went undercover as an “ex-
gay” to research for a screenplay entitled Save Me).
52. See id.
53. See Thea Jourdan, They believe this is love but what these men really need is a wife.
Right?, THE SCOTSMAN,  Aug. 20, 1998, at 13, available in 1998 WL 16856104 (quoting
interview with Dr. Barbara Hedge, a consultant clinical psychologist at London’s St.
Bartholomew’s Hospital).  Dr. Hedge believes that the “ex-gay” advertisements will
make insecure homosexuals, who are already uncomfortable with their sexuality,
especially young people, feel worse about themselves.  Gay and lesbian youths “are
vulnerable because they are just discovering they are gay.  It takes time for them to
adjust and accept who they are.”  Id.
54. See Mary Jane Rotheram-Borus & M. Isabel Fernandez, Sexual Orientation and
Development Challenges Experienced by Gay and Lesbian Youths, 25 SUICIDE AND LIFE-
THREATENING BEHAV. 26 (Supp. 1995) (finding that “coming out” is a developmental
process, which is more difficult for youths, consisting of four stages:  (1) recognizing
one’s self as lesbian or gay; (2) exploring sexual orientation by gaining information
about the gay and lesbian community; (3) disclosing to others; and (4) accepting
one’s sexual orientation).
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counterparts to feel isolated and withdrawn,55 to be victims of
assaults,56 and to attempt suicide.57  Despite the fragile mental state of
gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths,58 and the low success rate of this
form of therapy,59 “reparative” therapists and “ex-gay” ministries
continue to claim that homosexuality is a mental illness that can, and
should, be changed.60  Rather than exploiting mentally vulnerable
                                                 
55. See Anthony R. D’Augelli, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Development During
Adolescence and Young Adulthood, in TEXTBOOK OF HOMOSEXUALITY AND MENTAL
HEALTH 267, 273 (R.P. Cabaj & T.S. Stein eds., 1996) (discussing a sense of
“otherness” in gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths resulting from a societal message that
homoerotic desires and gay, lesbian, and bisexual identity are legitimate targets for
rejection and hate).
56. See id. at 275 (calculating results of various studies that show 59% of gay men
and 21% of lesbians report victimization in high school, and 50% and 12%,
respectively, report victimization in junior high school).
57. See id. at 279 (reporting one study’s finding that 59% of gay male youths had
serious suicidal thoughts).  See generally Gary Remafedi, The Relationship Between Suicide
Risk and Sexual Orientation:  Results of a Population-Based Study, 88 AM. J. PUB. HEALTH,
57-60 (1998) (finding that suicide attempts were reported in 28.1% of gay males and
only 4.2% of heterosexual males, thereby drawing the conclusion that a strong
correlation between sexual orientation and suicide exists).  But see Peter Muehrer,
Suicide and Sexual Orientation:  A Critical Summary of Recent Research and Directions for
Future Research, 25 SUICIDE AND LIFE-THREATENING BEHAV. 72 (Supp. 1995) (stating
that because there is no national or statewide data on the frequency and causes of
completed suicides, it is unknown whether gays and lesbians have a higher
percentage); LaBarbera, supra note 7 (claiming that the higher percentage is a myth
used by gay activists based on a “deeply flawed and pro-homosexual report by San
Francisco homosexual activist Paul Gibson”).
58. See Anthony D’Augelli & Scott Hershberger, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Youth in
Community Settings:  Personal Challenges and Mental Health Problems, 21 AM. J.
COMMUNITY PSYCHOL. 421, 443-44 (1993) (concluding that lesbian, gay and bisexual
youths are at risk for psychological problems and that 60% reported being
overwhelmed within the last year).
59. See Hanna Rosin, Religious Movement is Claiming Success in Converting Gays,
PORTLAND OREGONIAN, Aug. 27, 1998, at A14 (reporting that only 3% of those who go
through “reparative” therapy are mentally stable and have no homosexual fantasies);
cf. Ralph Blair, The Real Changes Taking Place, OPEN HANDS, Fall 1986, at ¶ 24
(claiming that, as of 1986, most of the leaders of “ex-gay” ministries have never been
homosexuals); Chris Bull, Peddling The Cure, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 24, 1998, at 55
(describing a conversation with a counselor who said he had never been a
homosexual but chose to work with homosexuals because, “he saw so many men
dealing with the issues of male-to-male intimacy and masculinity”).  These two
articles suggest that, for the most part, it is heterosexuals who are, and have been for
some time, leading the “reparative” therapy movement.  See id.  The “ex-gay”
ministries claim a 30% success rate, but no long-term studies are available.  See
Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 49.  Leland & Miller go on to mention that the
founders of Exodus, Gary Cooper and Michael Bussee, left the organization in 1979
because they fell in love and since then, thirteen Exodus ministries closed because
their directors decided to return to homosexuality.  See id.
60. See Rosin, supra note 59, at A14 (reporting that attempts to treat
homosexuality range from counseling abstinence in homosexual activity to practicing
exorcisms).  Further, an early study shows a success rate of only 10%.  See id.
Nineteen of the original 30 patients, however, refused to participate in a follow-up
study; eight of the 11 who did participate reported having “neurotic conflicts” about
their sexual identity; only three reported having no homosexual fantasies.  See id.  See
generally Miye A. Goishi, Unlocking the Closet Door:  Protecting Children From Involuntary
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youths, therapists should be working towards ending the stigma of
mental illness that has for too long been associated with
homosexuality.61
III. WHAT CONSTITUTES CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT
A. Child Abuse and Neglect Law
1. History and developments
Today, most states recognize mental and emotional abuse under
child abuse and neglect statutes.62  Historically, however, the law
recognized only those claims that rested on physical injuries because
mental and emotional distress claims were considered too
speculative.63  During the early part of the twentieth century,
psychology came to be regarded as a science.64  Consequentially,
mental and emotional harms were recognized as compensable
injuries at common law.65  Eventually, recognition of emotional abuse
                                                 
Civil Commitment Because of Their Sexual Orientation, 48 HASTINGS L.J. 1137, 1154
(1997) (reviewing some of the major changes within the American Psychiatric
Association’s treatment of sexual orientation).  Goishi notes that the American
Psychiatric Association removed homosexuality from the list of mental illnesses in the
DSM in 1973, thus deciding that homosexuality should not be considered a per se
mental disorder.  See id. at 1154-55.  Further, the APA removed “Ego-Dystonic
Homosexuality” in the revised DSM-III-R in 1987, eliminating all mental illness
traditionally associated with gays, lesbians, and bisexuals.  See id.  Goishi also notes
that transgender individuals, as well as lesbian, gay, and bisexual youths, can still be
diagnosed as suffering from GID, which remains a mental illness today in the DSM-IV
published in 1994.  See id. at 1156.
61. See APA Resolution, supra note 35, at 2 (reporting that the APA “urges all
mental health professionals to take the lead in removing the stigma of mental illness
that has long been associated with homosexual orientation”); see also D’Augelli, supra
note 55, at 283 (claiming that the appropriate method for mental health
professionals to deal with gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender individuals is to
help them overcome society’s stigmas around their identity and to take the lead in
developing affirmative services and support groups).
62. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-30-103(3) (Michie 1987) (recognizing mental
injury in Arkansas’ child abuse statute); D.C. CODE ANN. § 6-2101(13) (1995)
(recognizing “mental injury” in the District of Columbia child abuse statute); IND.
CODE ANN. § 31-34-1-2 (Michie 1997) (recognizing “endangerment of physical or
mental health” as a form of child abuse); LA. CHILD. CODE art. 1103(5)(a) (West
1995 & Supp. 1999) (defining abuse, inter alia, as “infliction of physical or mental
injury which causes deterioration to the child”); MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN.
§ 722.622(2)(e) (West 1993 & Supp. 1999) (determining that “mental injury”
constitutes child abuse); N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012 (McKinney 1999) (recognizing
“impairment to emotional health” in New York’s child abuse statute).
63. See G. Edward White, TORT LAW IN AMERICA 103 (1985) (noting that during
the Realist Period, between 1910 and 1945, psychological harms began to be
recognized within the legal system as bona fide injuries).
64. See id. (discussing how psychology’s diagnostic techniques began to be
recognized as capable of identifying bona fide emotional distress).
65. See id. (explaining the progression of willingness by the courts to award
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as a crime emerged with regard to child abuse and neglect.66
2. New York state case law
The State of New York is a sizable state with thorough statutory law
and sufficient case law on child abuse and neglect.67  This Comment,
therefore, selected the laws of the State of New York as a framework
for analyzing whether “reparative” therapy constitutes child abuse
and neglect.68  In New York, child abuse and neglect cases repeatedly
arise from the following situations:  sexual assault on the child,69
failure to maintain contact with the child,70 a third party witness of
abuse of the child accompanied by non-intervention,71 the child
witnessing domestic violence,72 administering excessive corporal
                                                 
damages for emotional harm).  White claims that, as psychology began to be
regarded as a science, the court system began to realize that bona fide emotional
distress could be distinguished from the feigned variety (i.e., it could be
distinguished through expert testimony).  See id.
66. See supra note 62 (listing some states that include emotional abuse in their
child abuse statutes).  Today, not all states have emotional abuse in their child abuse
laws even though they do in other areas of law.  Compare TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. §
101.009 (West 1998) (naming only physical abuse as constituting child abuse in
Texas), with TEX. BUS. & COM. CODE ANN. § 17.50(a) (West 1996 & Supp. 1999)
(recognizing mental anguish in Texas tort law).
67. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012.  New York defines “neglected child” as any child
under 18 years of age “whose physical, mental, or emotional condition has been
impaired or is in imminent danger of becoming impaired as a result of the failure of
his parent or other person legally responsible for his care to exercise a minimum
degree of care.”  Id. § 1012(f)(i).  The Act defines “impairment of emotional health”
and “impairment of mental or emotional condition” as “a state of substantially
diminished psychological or intellectual functioning in relation to, but not limited
to, such factors as failure to thrive, control of aggressive or self-destructive impulses,
ability to think and reason, or acting out or misbehaving, including incorrigibility,
ungovernability or habitual truancy.”  Id. § 1012(h).
68. Child abuse is governed by state law.  A similar analysis, however, can be done
with any state law recognizing psychological harms in its child abuse statutes.  See
supra note 62 (listing several state child abuse laws); see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012
(discussing at length the basis for penalizing child abuse in New York).
69. See In re Olivia “YY,” 619 N.Y.S.2d 212, 212 (App. Div. 1994) (concluding that,
absent an innocent reason explaining otherwise, the element of sexual gratification
necessary for a finding of neglect could be inferred from a mother’s act of touching
her child’s genitalia).
70. See In re C., 677 N.Y.S.2d 177, 178 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that, even while
incarcerated, a parent is obligated to maintain contact with a child and plan for his
or her future; failure to do so constitutes neglect).
71. See In re Rita “XX,” 672 N.Y.S.2d 481, 482 (App. Div. 1998) (finding that a
mother neglected her children where she defended the abusive father rather than
intervene to protect the children).
72. See In re Deandre T., 676 N.Y.S.2d 666, 667 (App. Div. 1998) (finding neglect
where the father violently abused the child’s mother in the child’s presence).  The
court noted that witnessing domestic violence constitutes neglect because it can
impair the child’s mental and emotional health.  See id.  The court also found
derivative neglect of a sibling who did not witness the abuse.  See id.  Where no
physical injury to the child results, the child is generally found to be neglected,
rather than abused.  See id.
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punishment,73 and living with a parent who has a drug-abuse
problem.74  New York, however, also recognizes less extreme cases of
abuse and neglect.75
With regard to “reparative” therapy, a child who is kidnapped,
taken to an in-patient center, and drugged for most of their teenage
years would legally qualify as an abused and neglected child.76  In
determining what constitutes abuse and neglect, however, the trier of
fact must look to both the language of the child abuse and neglect
statute and the case law interpreting the statute.77  Although a child
who is kidnapped and drugged for non-therapeutic purposes may be
a clear case of abuse and neglect, deciding whether a child is abused
or neglected is more difficult where the abuse is less severe.78  An
example of less severe abuse is a child seeing a therapist who employs
behavioral modification, or a child spending time at an “ex-gay”
ministry praying to be saved.79  The following section provides a
framework for which types of “reparative” therapy would constitute
abuse and neglect.
3. Specific child abuse and neglect cases
Examining situations in which New York courts have found abuse
or neglect will provide a framework for determining whether less
extreme instances of “reparative” therapy can constitute abuse or
neglect.80  In In re Glenn “II,” 81 the court determined that allowing a
                                                 
73. See In re Clarice B., 677 N.Y.S.2d 569, 570 (App. Div. 1998) (holding that a
father neglected children when he inflicted corporal punishment on them and left
children unattended).  The court also stressed that the children’s best interests must
be considered; here, as in the other cases, it was in the best interests of the children
to be removed from their abusive parent.  See id.; see also N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT
§ 1012(f)(i)(B) (stating that excessive corporal punishment constitutes neglect).
74. See In re Masa Qwawi D., 665 N.Y.S.2d 437, 438 (App. Div. 1997) (holding that
a mother’s drug abuse problem, coupled with her failure to complete a
rehabilitation program, was sufficient to evidence her failure to plan for her
children’s future and therefore, constituted permanent neglect).
75. See In re Glenn II, 650 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1996) (concluding that a
parent neglected children when children continued to have access to cigarettes,
lighters, and matches).
76. Because homosexuality and bisexuality are not illnesses, see APA Resolution,
supra note 35, and “reparative” therapy frequently involves severe tactics, see supra
notes 40-52 and accompanying text, this Comment argues that subjecting a child to
such “therapy” constitutes abuse and neglect.
77. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(f)(i) (defining neglect as physical, mental, or
emotional impairment, or imminent danger of impairment, as a result of a parent’s
failure to exercise due care, which a trier of fact must apply to the facts of a given
case).
78. See infra notes 96-100 and accompanying text (explaining the reasonably
prudent parent standard in determining parental neglect of a child).
79. See infra notes 107-08 and accompanying text (explaining “ex-gay” ministries
as a type of “reparative” therapy).
80. Because there are no abuse and neglect cases directly examining “reparative”
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child access to cigarettes, lighters, and matches constituted neglect
because the parent had knowledge of the child’s previous
experimentation with these items.82  The court reasoned that where a
parent fails to recognize how his or her actions or inactions affect a
child with a unique disposition to a particular harmful activity, the
state may determine that the child is neglected and therefore, may
deem the parent unfit and remove the child.83  The court in In re
Glenn “II” stressed that a mother failed to take necessary precautions
to protect her children from danger and therefore, was not a proper
guardian.84
Similarly, In re Jerry “XX” 85 involved a mother who petitioned the
court to get her children back after they were deemed permanently
neglected and placed in foster care.86  The court found that the
mother “refused to acknowledge the existence or severity of her
children’s problems, particularly those of her three older children
who were emotionally disturbed.”87 Accordingly, the court held that
the mother did not deserve to be reunited with her children.88
These cases are not unique.  Parents who do not acknowledge their
child(ren)’s special needs are often found to be unfit and courts have
considered their children to be neglected.89  In these cases, courts
                                                 
therapy, this Comment draws out standards based on precedent and compares those
cases with the reported and published accounts of what occurs in “reparative”
therapy to determine whether “reparative” therapy constitutes child abuse or neglect.
81. 650 N.Y.S.2d 49 (App. Div. 1996).
82. See id. at 50 (acknowledging that parental failure to protect children, by
locking up cigarettes, lighters, and matches, impaired the physical, mental, and
emotional well-being of the children).
83. See id. (stating that the mother failed to intervene meaningfully after children
attempted to burn her bed while the mother and daughter were asleep in it).
84. See id. (determining that allowing children access to dangerous items
amounts to neglect).
85. 671 N.Y.S.2d 160 (App. Div. 1998).
86. See id. at 161 (finding that the mother consistently failed to recognize her
responsibility in adhering to a comprehensive social work plan to regain custody, and
that the mother refused to acknowledge the existence and severity of her children’s
emotional problems).
87. Id.
88. See id. at 162 (finding that the mother failed to plan for children’s future by
refusing to address the reasons why the children were placed in foster care
originally).  The court pointed out that the state’s department of social services
developed a comprehensive plan designed to make the mother fit to take care of her
children and worked with the mother for three years leading up to the placement of
her children in foster care.  Still, the mother failed to acknowledge her role in why
the children were taken away and also failed to acknowledge her need for the
services that were offered in the agency’s plan.  See id.
89. See, e.g., In re Kaleb “U,” 674 N.Y.S.2d 825, 826 (App. Div. 1998) (adjudging a
child neglected because the child required extra-sensitive care due to a central
nervous system disorder and the mother failed to understand the severity of her
child’s condition); In re Jerry “XX,” 671 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (App. Div. 1998) (finding
the children neglected because the mother refused to acknowledge the existence
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require parents to know and understand their children’s special
needs and to make strong efforts to address them.90
In In re Jamie “J,” 91  the court found that a mother had neglected
her children where she made no effort to ensure that her child
attended school, and failed to notice her other child’s anti-social
behavior.92  This decision emphasizes the duty of all parents to be
attentive to their child’s specific needs.93  The court found that her
indifference to, and lack of understanding of, her parental duties put
her children at the risk of being impaired.94  These cases are
indicative of the state’s interest in ensuring that parents are not only
actively involved in their children’s lives, but also that they are
responsive to the individual child’s specific circumstances.95
B. The Reasonably Prudent Parent Standard
New York courts have adopted the reasonably prudent parent
standard96 to determine whether a parent has abused or neglected his
or her child.97  The courts have applied this standard to find that a
                                                 
and severity of her children’s emotional problems and, as a result, the children were
unreceptive to treatment); In re Glenn “II,” 650 N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1996)
(declaring children neglected because the mother failed to take responsible
precautions to limit children’s access to cigarettes and lighters despite knowledge of
children’s dangerous propensity to use these items).
90. In Glenn, the court found that the parents were required to take necessary
precautions with regard to locking up the cigarettes, lighters, and matches.  See
Glenn, 650 N.Y.S.2d at 50.  In Kaleb, the court stated that parents needed to posses
“quick and effective” responses to their child’s special needs.  See Kaleb, 674 N.Y.S.2d
at 826.  In Jerry, the court emphasized that, to be a fit parent, the mother should have
sought mental health and alcoholism counseling. See Jerry,  671 N.Y.S.2d at 161.  In all
of these cases, the parents failed to do what was necessary given their child’s specific
situation, and in each case, the court removed the children from the parents’ homes.
91. 619 N.Y.S.2d 367 (App. Div. 1994).
92. See id. at 368.
93. See id. (noting that the mother failed to report her child missing when he
disappeared for the entire weekend and allowed him to associate with a convicted
pedophile).
94. See id. (asserting that a parent’s inability to comprehend that their action, or
inaction, could lead to mental, emotional, or physical impairment of their child is
sufficient to find that the children are neglected).
95. See Jerry, 671 N.Y.S.2d at 62 (terminating parental rights specifically because a
parent failed to exercise diligent efforts to strengthen parental relationship and
eliminate the very reasons for the child’s placement in foster care).
96. See Enright v. Busy Bee Playschool, 625 N.Y.S.2d 453, 454 (App. Div. 1995)
(discussing personal injury action brought by preschool student who fell from slide
against a preschool, and determining that school owed duty of “prudent parent,”
which is a higher duty than “ordinary reasonable care”); In re Robert “YY,” 605
N.Y.S.2d 418, 420 (App. Div. 1993) (characterizing the reasonably prudent parent
standard as both “knew or reasonably should have known” and “that a reasonably
prudent parent would have acted differently and, in doing so, prevented the injury”).
97. See Robert, 605 N.Y.S.2d at 420 (explaining that a parent or other custodial
party may only be held responsible for the abusive acts committed by another if he or
she “knew or should have known” that the child was in jeopardy) (citations omitted);
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reasonably prudent parent has a duty to investigate the places where
the child will spend time and the people who will supervise the
child.98  This is relevant to “reparative” therapy because, before
providing “reparative” therapy to a child, a parent would be required
to investigate the “ex-gay” ministries and the “reparative” therapy
movement.99  The parents would discover that “reparative” therapy is
not accepted in the mainstream medical community.100  Support for
the argument that the reasonably prudent parent would, upon
investigation, discover the potential dangers of “reparative” therapy
can be found in the national attention that both the horrible history
of “reparative” therapy101 and the views of its current critics102 have
received in national magazines such as Newsweek,103 and on national
television programs such as NBC’s Dateline.104  Parents of gay, lesbian,
                                                 
see also In re Rhiannon B., 654 N.Y.S.2d 537, 538 (App. Div. 1997) (applying
reasonably prudent parent standard to sexual abuse case and concluding that the
parent had “a fundamental defect in [her] understanding of the duties and
obligations of parenthood, and created an atmosphere detrimental to the physical,
mental and emotional well-being of the [other children] as well”) (citation omitted);
In re Joseph “DD,” 624 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App. Div. 1995) (holding that a reasonable
prudent parent would not leave a child at a house with no stove, running water, or
refrigerator, and where the front doorway was covered only by a plastic sheet); In re
N.Y. City Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 599 N.Y.S.2d 66, 68 (App. Div. 1993) (applying the
“should have known” version of the reasonably prudent parent standard in sexual
abuse case and concluding that, although parent may not have had actual
knowledge, she should have known that child was in imminent danger of sexual
abuse); In re Jose Y., 576 N.Y.S.2d 297, 299 (App. Div. 1991) (finding that mother’s
neglect in not recognizing or intervening in father’s sexual abuse of one child posed
a continuous danger to the physical, mental and emotional health of children).
98. See Joseph, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 478 (“Simply stated, we find it inconceivable that a
reasonably prudent parent would leave his or her child for an extended period of
time without first investigating where the child would be staying.”) (emphasis added).
99. See id. (adopting an investigating requirement).
100. See BEHAVIORAL HEALTH TREATMENT, supra note 36, at 5 (reporting that APA
members “agreed that conversion therapies have not proven effective, and that they
prey on prejudice and ignorance about sexual orientation”).
101. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 47.
102. See id. at 48 (stating that the APA officially declared “reparative” therapy
scientifically ineffective and possibly harmful).
103. See id. (reporting on criticisms of “reparative” therapy to a national
audience).
104. See Dateline Interview with Jane Pauley (NBC television broadcast, Nov. 28,
1997).  This broadcast reported that gay men who went through “aversion therapy”
were shocked with electrodes as they looked at photos of nude men, were given
injections of testosterone when they were shown pictures of nude women, and in the
most extreme cases, were given lobotomies.  See id.  The visibility of the “ex-gay”
movement is gaining national attention.  See Khan, supra note 10, at 28.  Khan
describes the growth of the “reparative” therapy movement:
The visibility of the ex-gay movement is growing not only within the
Christian Right but also on the Internet, within mainstream news media, and
in society at large.  FRC [Family Research Council] is showcasing the
movement’s ideas in a new video, movement leaders have been appearing on
TV and radio shows, and CBS’s 60 Minutes aired a segment about ex-gays
this past March [1997].  Exodus has received mention in other national
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bisexual, and transgender children should also be aware of the
hardships that their children face as a result of societal
homophobia.105  A reasonably prudent parent who discovers that
some “ex-gay” ministries perform exorcisms106 and provide unsound
psychological counseling107 would not place their child in the care of
such an “ex-gay” ministry or “reparative” therapist.108
C. The Breadth of the Child Abuse and Neglect Statute
The New York state statute grants courts discretion to decide
whether certain activities constitute abuse or neglect where the
statute is vague or silent on a given issue.109  Section 1012(f)(I)(B) of
the New York statute has been interpreted to mean that actual injury
is not a prerequisite to a finding of neglect.110  Because actual injury is
                                                 
media including the Washington Post, National Public Radio, Hard Copy, the
Jerry Springer Show, and the Sally Jesse Raphael Show.
Id.
105. See generally D’Augelli & Hershberger, supra note 58, at 420.  Information on
gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths is published in mainstream journals
such as the American Psychological Association’s Journal and The American Journal of
Community Psychology, which are available to the public.  See id.
106. See Rosin, supra note 59, at A14 (noting that some of the more fringe groups
within the movement, such as Life Ministries, practice exorcisms to “cure”
homosexuals).
107. See supra notes 34-39 and accompanying text (describing the denouncement
of “reparative” therapy by the APA, the American Psychiatric Association, the
American Psychoanalytic Association, and the American Academy of Pediatrics).
108. See generally David Kirby, From Soft Words to Hard Fists, THE ADVOCATE, Nov. 24,
1998, at 39 (providing an example of a parent who did put his child in “reparative”
therapy).  Kirby describes an article in Focus on the Family Magazine that recounts a
father’s disgust over his son’s homosexuality and portrays the father’s feelings as
perfectly acceptable.  See id.  The parent glamorized in the article threatened to kill
his child or the person who encouraged the child to become a homosexual.  See id.
The article states that the only reason the father decided not to kill anyone was
because he did not want to go to prison, and instead sent his son to an “ex-gay”
ministry.  See id.; see also CHRIS BULL & JOHN GALLAGHER, PERFECT ENEMIES:  THE
RELIGIOUS RIGHT, THE GAY MOVEMENT, AND THE POLITICS OF THE 1990’S at 98 (1996)
(stressing the importance of the fact that James Dobson founded Focus on the Family
Magazine in 1977, seven years after he wrote the book Dare to Discipline, where he
encouraged corporal punishment for children).  Dobson later took over The Family
Research Council (“FRC”), which endorses “reparative” therapy.  See supra notes 7 &
12 (discussing the FRC’s position endorsing “reparative” therapy).
109. See N.Y. FAM. LAW § 1012(f)(I)(B) (McKinney 1998) (“In providing the child
with proper supervision or guardianship, by unreasonably inflicting or allowing to be
inflicted harm, or a substantial risk thereof or by any other acts of a similarly serious
nature requiring the aid of the court . . . .”) (emphasis added).  “Reparative” therapy is
not specifically named in the statute.  See id.
110. See In re Billy Jean “II,” 640 N.Y.S.2d 326, 327 (App. Div. 1996) (holding that
actual physical, emotional, or mental injury to the child is not necessary to find that a
child has been neglected).  The court found that, because the child was described as
“dirty,” and the trailer in which he lived as “disgusting,” the child was considered
neglected even absent actual injury.  See id. at 328.  An analysis of the socio-economic
bias present in many of these cases is beyond the scope of this Comment.  For a
discussion on the classism and racism prevalent in the child welfare system, see
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not required, it is clear that the statute was intended to reach a large
number of cases.111  Poor hygiene or unsanitary and unsafe living
conditions can constitute neglect, even where the conditions did not
harm the child.112  Further evidence of the statute’s breadth is found
in In re Madeline R,113 in which the court interpreted the statute as not
requiring a “showing of past or present harm to the children to
support a finding of neglect.”114
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Precedent Applied to Cases Involving “Reparative” Therapy
The points outlined above support the argument that “reparative”
therapy could constitute child abuse and neglect under the New York
statute for the following reasons:  (1) the courts’ readiness to protect
children who are at danger of being physically, mentally, or
emotionally harmed;115 (2) the courts’ focus on a parent’s need to
recognize a child’s specific situation;116 and (3) the easily discoverable
information on the negative consequences of “reparative” therapy
that a reasonably prudent parent would find.117  In the child abuse
and neglect cases outlined above, the courts held a parent negligent
for failing to understand the specific needs of his or her child.118  If
this line of reasoning is applied to lesbian, gay, bisexual, and
transgender youths who are forced to go through “reparative”
therapy, parents should be held responsible for not recognizing the
delicate mental and emotional states of gay children.119  Rather than
subjecting their children to a medically unsound procedure120 with a
                                                 
generally Jennifer Aynes Hand, Preventing Undue Terminations: A Critical Evaluation of
the Length-of-Time-Out-of-Custody Grounds For Termination of Parental Rights, 71 N.Y.U. L.
REV. 1251, 1267 n.92 & n.93 (1996).
111. See id. (“Neglect determination is based upon respondent’s failure to provide
the child with the proper supervision of guardianship by misusing alcoholic
beverages to the extent that he loses self-control of his actions.”).
112. See id. at 327 (finding neglect where there were “dirty dishes with encrusted
food all over the kitchen”).
113. 625 N.Y.S.2d 512 (App. Div. 1995).
114. See id. at 513 (emphasis added).
115. See supra Part III.A.3 (summarizing abuse and neglect cases).
116. See supra Part III.B (describing how the reasonably prudent parent standard
requires parents to understand and provide for their child’s specific needs).
117. See supra notes 101-04 and accompanying text (summarizing national visibility
of the “ex-gay” movement).
118. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing specific cases of potential neglect in which
parents failed to provide basic needs for their children).
119. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text (discussing societal pressures
specific to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender youths).
120. See supra notes 34-38 and accompanying text (summarizing the views of the
APA, American Psychiatric Association, American Psychoanalytic Association,
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very low success rate,121 these parents should be held legally
responsible for ensuring their child’s emotional well-being.122
B. Further Considerations in Finding Abuse and Neglect
It is likely that other forms of abuse already exist in a family that
would seek “reparative” therapy.123  Studies on violence directed at
gay, lesbian, and bisexual youths indicate that as much as sixty-one
percent of sexual-orientation-related violence occurs within the
family.124  Specialists in gay and lesbian youth violence also note that
“for many of the youth, their families’ religious commitments set the
stage for rejections of different kinds, ranging from begrudging
acknowledgements to forceful rejections from the household.”125  In
these situations, if a child is removed from the abusive home, the
child will not be returned to the home unless the parents take
measures to correct the problems that led to the child’s removal.126
Courts have required parents to make diligent efforts to ensure that if
a child is returned, the problems are no longer present.127  In one
                                                 
American Academy of Pediatrics, and other researchers on the negative effects of
“reparative” therapy).
121. See Rosin, supra note 59, at A14 (reporting that only three percent of those in
the study who went through “reparative” therapy demonstrate the results the
program sets out to provide).
122. See, e.g., In re Jerry “XX,” 671 N.Y.S.2d 160, 161 (App. Div. 1998) (validating
the “termination of mother’s parental rights as warranted by her consistent failure to
acknowledge the existence or severity of her children’s problems, particularly those
of her three older children who were emotionally disturbed”); In re Glenn “II,” 650
N.Y.S.2d 49, 50 (App. Div. 1996) (reasoning that a parent allowing her children to
have continued access to cigarettes and lighters amounted to child neglect in light of
her knowledge that the children had previously experimented with cigarettes and
fire).
123. See Anthony D’Augelli & Lawrence J. Dark, Lesbian, Gay and Bisexual Youth, in
REASONS TO HOPE:  A PSYCHOSOCIAL PERSPECTIVE ON VIOLENCE AND YOUTH 177, 183-84
(L.D. Eron et al. eds., 1995) (summarizing studies on abuse in homes with gay and
lesbian youths and finding that 61% of violence against gay, lesbian, and bisexual
youths occurred within the family; 19-41% of the abuse involved verbal insults and
threats; and four to seven percent of the abuse involved physical violence).
124. See id. at 183 (gathering data from a 1990 study of lesbian and gay youths at a
New York social service agency).
125. Anthony D’Augelli, Developmental Implications of Victimization of Lesbian, Gay,
and Bisexual Youths, in STIGMA AND SEXUAL ORIENTATION, UNDERSTANDING PREJUDICE
AGAINST LESBIANS, GAY MEN AND BISEXUALS 187, 198 (G.M. Herek ed., 1998)
(emphasis added).
126. See In re Society For Seaman’s Children, 638 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (App. Div.
1996) (holding that to be reunited with a child previously determined to be abused
or neglected, a parent must plan for the child’s future, which includes correcting the
conditions that led to the original removal).  Although the mother attended therapy
sessions, the court found that her failure to make therapeutic progress was a failure
to meet her parental obligation.  See id.
127. See id. (finding that parental obligations include addressing and overcoming
the problems that originally endangered the child); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455
U.S. 745, 766 (1982) (“Under New York law, a judge has ample discretion to ensure
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case, a court noted that even where a parent attended therapy
sessions, failure to make therapeutic progress meant that she was not
fulfilling her parental responsibility to ensure that the conditions
which led to the removal were eradicated.128
All parents must ensure a healthy domestic setting.129  For a parent
of a gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender child this may involve
supporting the child’s sexual identity, promoting his or her healthy
well-being, helping to educate the public about the facts on
homosexuality and bisexuality, and advocating an end to
discrimination.130  If a parent believes that placing his or her child in
“reparative” therapy is an appropriate way of supporting his or her
child, the court can, and indeed must, still find abuse or neglect if
the child suffers as a result, because the parent’s motives, no matter
how genuine, are irrelevant.131
Another step for parents to take to ensure correction of an
unacceptable condition within the family could be to join a parent
support group132 or to help their children find an affirming support
group.133  Parents’ attendance at these support groups alone,
                                                 
that, once removed from his natural parents on grounds of neglect, a child will not
return to a hostile environment.”).
128. See Seaman’s Children, 638 N.Y.S.2d at 668; see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 767
(relying on N.Y. SOC. SERV. LAWS § 384-b.1(a)(iv) to find that failure to make
progress was sufficient evidence that the parent could not provide a suitable family
home).
129. See In re Christopher “O,” 611 N.Y.S.2d 930, 931 (App. Div. 1994) (holding
that overcoming the personal and familial problems that led to the child being
removed from the house is, at minimum, required before a parent can be reunited
with his or her child); see also Santosky, 455 U.S. at 766 (proscribing that a child will
not be returned to a hostile environment); supra Part III.B (describing requirements
for adequate parenting).
130. See “Reparative” Therapy or “Ex-Gay” Ministries, PFLAG Newsletter (Parents and
Friends of Lesbians and Gays Issue Guide, Washington, D.C.), July 1998, at 1
(suggesting that support, education, and advocacy to end discrimination are
important ways for parents to demonstrate to their gay and lesbian children that they
accept them).  Although a parent who believes homosexuality is unhealthy or
immoral may not wish to work towards eliminating societal homophobia, the
mainstream medical community has spoken out against irrational fear of
homosexuals.  Thus, if a parent’s fear or hatred of homosexuality results in
emotional injury to the child, it should constitute abuse and neglect under N.Y. FAM.
LAW § 1012 (McKinney 1999).  See id. at 2.
131. See Dumpson v. Daniel M., N.Y. Law Journal (Oct. 16, 1974) 17 c. 7, appeal
dismissed, 389 N.Y.S. 2d 860 (N.Y. App. Div. 1976), reprinted in JUDITH AREEN, FAMILY
LAW 1399, 1402 (3d ed. 1992) (deciding that even though the court was sympathetic
to the parent’s motive in “disciplining” his child, the motive was irrelevant in the
context of child abuse and neglect law because child welfare is superior to the rights
of the parent).
132. See D’Augelli & Hershberger, supra note 58, at 443 (recommending that
parent support groups, such as those offered by Parents and Friends of Lesbians and
Gays (“PFLAG”) in metropolitan areas, would help the parent-child relationship
when a child discloses sexual orientation to his or her parent).
133. See D’Augelli, supra note 125, at 205 (recommending support groups to
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however, may not constitute a correction of the problem; rather, the
parents may also have an obligation to progress in their
understanding and acceptance of their lesbian, gay, bisexual, or
transgender child.134
Thus, where “reparative” therapy constitutes the only form of
abuse, a court has the power to remove the child.135  Similarly, where
abuse already exists in some form and the child has been removed, a
family will have to correct the hostile environment that led to abuse
in the first instance before the child is reunited with the family.136
Part IV.C discusses possible roadblocks to judicial recognition that a
gay, lesbian, bisexual, or transgender child placed in “reparative”
therapy has been abused or neglected.
C. Foreseeable Problems with Judicial Recognition
A potential roadblock to a judge’s finding that “reparative” therapy
constitutes child abuse is that Gender Identity Disorder (“GID”) is
still considered a mental illness.137  The American Psychiatric
Association, which publishes the Diagnostic and Statistical Manual of
Mental Disorders (“DSM”), defines GID as a mental illness.138  This
definition is problematic because some psychiatrists use behavior
therapy to treat GID because they believe that successful treatment of
GID will prevent homosexuality or bisexuality.139  “Reparative”
                                                 
ensure development into well-functioning gay, lesbian, and bisexual adults).
134. See In re Society For Seaman’s Children, 638 N.Y.S.2d 668, 669 (App. Div.
1996) (finding that making “therapeutic progress,” not just attending therapy, was
the prerequisite for a mother to be reunited with her child).  See generally In re Leslie
C, 614 N.Y.S.2d 855, 863 (Fam. Ct. 1994) (finding that parents were not negligent
where their teenage daughter was pregnant).  It is important to note that if a parent
knows that their gay, lesbian, or bisexual teenager is sexually active and they do not
act to prevent the activity, they will not be found to have neglected their child.  See id.
at 856.  The court in Leslie C held that an abuse finding could not be based on the
mere fact that the teenage daughter was pregnant.  See id.  The court stated that
where parent knows their child is sexually active, they are not legally responsible for
intervening unless they have personal knowledge that the sexual encounter is forced,
i.e., not consensual.  See id.
135. See supra Part III.A.2 (defining neglect and abuse).
136. See supra Part IV.B (discussing reuniting requirements).
137. See AMERICAN PSYCHIATRIC ASSOCIATION, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL
OF MENTAL DISORDERS 532-38 (4th ed. 1997) [hereinafter DSM].  The American
Psychiatric Association defines GID as a strong and persistent cross gender identity,
accompanied by discomfort with one’s own sex, distress or impairment in societal
role, and not accompanied by an intersexed condition.  See id. at 536.  Children
suffering from GID manifest such symptoms as:  frequently passing as the other sex,
desiring to live or be treated as the other sex, and believing that she or he has
feelings typical of the other sex.  See id.
138. See id. at xv (recognizing that the “DSM-IV” is considered the most widely
accepted source of mental illnesses for reference by both mental health practitioners
and the medical community in the United States).
139. See Goishi, supra note 60, at 1157-58 (stating that because some mental health
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therapists, however, do not claim to be treating GID, but rather to be
treating homosexuality.140
In a family in which no other form of abuse exists, the seemingly
contradictory position of the American Psychiatric Association
disavowing “reparative” therapy and condoning treatment for GID
could cause confusion as to whether “reparative” therapy endangers
the child.141  Therefore, in applying the reasonably prudent parent
standard, a judge may not know whether a parent who subjected his
or her child to “reparative” therapy because of GID was acting
unreasonably.142
Another problem with ascertaining whether the parents’ true
intention was to change their child’s sexual orientation is that, until
very recently, the entire “reparative” therapy movement was
secretive.143  Because very few “reparative” therapists openly admit
                                                 
professionals believe that GID is a predicate to homosexuality, they disagree with the
removal of homosexuality from the DSM).  Goishi notes that some psychiatrists
believe behavioral therapy that teaches children to act in the stereotypical “correct”
ways of their biological gender can prevent potential homosexuality.  See id.  Goishi
also argues that these psychiatrists are among the minority within the mental health
profession and that GID is very controversial when it is used to disguise attempts to
“cure” homosexuality.  See id.; see also I Was Never Meant to Survive, NCLR NEWSLETTER
(National Center For Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, Cal.), Spring 1996, at 11
(discussing treatment used to “prevent” a teenager from becoming a lesbian).  This
article was written by a survivor of “reparative” therapy, Daphne Scholinski, who
spent most of her teenage life in a mental hospital because of her “masculine”
appearance.  See id.  Her parents were afraid she would grow up to be a lesbian; she
was diagnosed with GID, and her parents’ insurance covered her four-year stay in the
facility to learn to be more feminine.  See id.; cf. Daly v. Daly, 715 P.2d 56, 60 (Nev.
1986) (discussing, in a child custody case involving a transsexual father, the medical
professions’ belief as to the best way to treat transsexuality).  In Daly, the dissenting
judge argued that the father should not be penalized for getting a sex change
operation because “sex reassignment surgery is the best treatment available for a
transsexual” and thus, the father was getting the appropriate treatment.  See id. at 60
n.1.
140. See generally Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 49 (reporting that NARTH, the
psychoanalytic branch of the “ex-gay” movement, believes that homosexuality, not GID,
is a disorder that can and should be treated); see also Surina Khan, Homosexual
Healing, BOSTON MAG., July 1998, at 25-28 (examining the mission of “ex-gay”
ministries and “reparative” therapists to convert homosexuals into heterosexuals and
mentioning GID nowhere in this discussion).
141. Given the strong stance against “reparative” therapy by the mainstream
medical community, a court easily could find that a parent should have known of the
dangers of “reparative” therapy.  See In re Joseph “DD,” 624 N.Y.S.2d 476, 477 (App.
Div. 1995) (holding that a parent either knew or should have known the child was in
danger).  If, however, a parent claims that he or she placed the child in “reparative”
therapy because of a belief that the child suffered from GID, it may be harder for a
judge to hold that the parent acted unreasonably because GID is classified as a
mental illness.  See DSM, supra note 137, at 532-38.
142. See Joseph, 624 N.Y.S.2d at 477-78.
143. See Mirken, supra note 40, at 58 (describing failed attempts to persuade
centers to admit they performed “reparative” therapy).  Ultimately, “reparative”
therapy-type actions were confirmed during a “sting” operation, where a woman
posed as a mother of a gay teen and the center offered to treat her son’s
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that they attempt to change a child’s sexual orientation, proving such
an attempt to the court may be difficult.144  Similarly, in addition to
classifying a child as having GID, these therapists and in-patient
clinics would often diagnose a child with other APA-approved
illnesses recognized in the “DSM,” such as “oppositional defiant
disorder” and other so-called “adolescent conduct disorders.”145
Establishing that a parent sought “reparative” therapy to change a
child’s sexual orientation is only the first step in protecting the child
from future abuse.146  Parents have certain legal rights that can
prevent the state from intervening.147
D. Parental Defenses to a Claim of Child Abuse or Neglect
There is a symbiotic relationship between “reparative” therapy and
right-wing, Christian, political organizations.148  Therefore, this
Comment addresses whether a finding that “reparative” therapy
constitutes child abuse or neglect is unconstitutionally interfering in
either a parent’s free exercise of religion149 or the Fourteenth
Amendment’s guarantee of parental autonomy.150
1. First Amendment free exercise claim
a. Free Exercise Clause
The Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment, which applies to
                                                 
homosexuality.  See id.
144. See id. (noting that a leading proponent of “reparative” therapy denied
attempting to change a child’s sexuality by claiming that “reparative” therapy will not
work on people against their will).
145. See Project to Stop Mental Health Abuse of Lesbian, Gay, Bisexual and Transgender
Youth, NCLR NEWSLETTER (National Center for Lesbian Rights, San Francisco, Cal.),
May 1994, at 4 (naming these disorders and adding that “LGBT teens are
dangerously vulnerable to psychiatric labels that scapegoat and stigmatize teens for
social and family problems, and that frequently result in some form of
institutionalization.”).
146. See Mirken, supra note 40, at 56 (discussing parental prerogative in selecting
mental health treatment and even institutionalization for their children).
147. See infra Part IV.D (discussing potential defenses by parents to charges of
abuse).
148. See supra notes 10-13 and accompanying text (discussing right-wing, Christian,
political organizations’ support for “reparative” therapy and the “ex-gay” movement).
It is important to note that this Comment differentiates between Christianity
generally and right-wing, Christian, political organizations.  Any reference to right-
wing, Christian, political organizations is a reference specifically to those
organizations that support “reparative” therapy.
149. See U.S. CONST. amend. I (“Congress shall make no law respecting an
establishment of religion, or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”).
150. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 752 (1982) (recognizing the “Court’s
historical recognition that freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a
fundamental liberty interest protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
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the states through the Fourteenth Amendment,151 states that
“Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of religion,
or prohibiting the free exercise thereof . . . .”152
In Employment Division, Department of Human Resources v. Smith,153 a
plurality of the Supreme Court interpreted the Free Exercise Clause
to mean that the free exercise of religion is the “right to believe and
profess whatever religious doctrine one desires.  Thus, the First
Amendment obviously excludes all governmental regulation of
religious beliefs as such.”154  Smith, however, also held that religious
beliefs do not excuse disobeying an otherwise valid law.155  In Smith,
petitioners ingested sacramental peyote, an illegal drug under the
state’s criminal laws, during a Native American religious ritual.156  The
Court held that even though religious beliefs are protected, the
illegal act of ingesting peyote was not.157
The ability of the state to regulate religion, despite the strong
protection afforded to the free exercise of religion in the
Constitution, is further explained in Cantwell v. Connecticut.158  Cantwell
involved a man and his two sons, all Jehovah’s Witnesses, arrested for
inciting a breach of the peace.159  The Cantwells went door to door
playing a phonograph and trying to sell books about their faith.160
                                                 
151. See Cantwell v. Connecticut, 310 U.S. 296, 303 (1940) (extending the Free
Exercise Clause of the First Amendment to the states through the Fourteenth
Amendment).  In analyzing the First Amendment, the Cantwell Court noted that
there are two concepts:
Freedom of conscience and freedom to adhere to such religious
organizations or form of worship as the individual may choose cannot be
restricted by law.  On the other hand, it safeguards the free exercise of the
chosen form of religion.  Thus the Amendment embraces two concepts—
freedom to believe and freedom to act.  The first is absolute but, in the
nature of things, the second cannot be.  Conduct remains subject to
regulation for the protection of society.
Id. at 303-04.
152. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
153. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
154. Id. at 877 (citation omitted) (emphasis added).
155. See id. (“The mere possession of religious convictions which contradict the
relevant concerns of a political society does not relieve the citizen from the discharge
of political responsibilities.”); see also Bowen v. Roy,  476 U.S. 693, 701 (1982)
(holding that even where a parent believed that the use of a social security number
would impair the child’s spirit, a belief that stemmed from a Native American
religion, the state’s interest in administering the number was stronger than the
parent’s free exercise of religion).
156. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 874 (citing OR. REV. STAT. § 475.992(4) (1987)) (noting
that Oregon law prohibited possession of controlled substance unless prescribed by a
doctor).
157. See id. (differentiating between having a religious belief and performing (or
abstaining from) a physical act with regard to that religion).
158. 310 U.S. 296 (1940).
159. See id. at 300.
160. See id. at 301 (explaining that the men went to every house in the
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One of the records they played included a description of the book
“Enemies,” which included an attack on Catholicism.161
Approximately ninety percent of the people in that neighborhood
were Catholic; the Cantwells were promptly arrested.162  In Cantwell,
the Court held that the right to believe and adhere to a religion is
absolute, but the freedom to act based on religious beliefs is subject
to regulation for the protection of society.163
The Supreme Court recently reaffirmed Smith and Cantwell in City
of Boerne v. Flores.164  Flores stressed that a valid state law of general
applicability which only incidentally burdens someone’s religious
beliefs is constitutional.165  Because most religions involve some
physical act in compliance with the belief, for example drinking wine
or assembling, these religious acts are only permissible if they do not
violate a neutral and valid state law, such as the state’s child abuse
and neglect laws.166  To hold otherwise would permit conduct that not
only hurts society as a whole but, in the case of “reparative” therapy,
facilitates violence against individuals under the guise of the freedom
of religion.167
b. Applying this law to “reparative” therapy
Under the theory that religious beliefs are protected but certain
religious acts are not, parents are constitutionally permitted to
                                                 
neighborhood attempting to play religious records and distribute literature to the
neighbors, as well as solicit donations).
161. See id. at 303.
162. See id.  (noting that none of the residents questioned about the incident were
Jehovah’s Witnesses).
163. See id. at 303-04 (stating that although the Fourteenth Amendment
“embraces” both the freedom to believe and to act, the latter is not an absolute
freedom).
164. 521 U.S. 507 (1997).  The Court reaffirmed Smith and declared that The
Religious Freedom Restoration Act of 1993 (“RFRA”) was an unconstitutional
attempt by Congress to overrule Smith by requiring the stringent “compelling
interest” test.  See id. at 534.  The Court found that a compelling interest test would
impermissibly intrude on a state’s right to enact its own laws and that the means used
by Congress are disproportionate to its legitimate ends.  See id.
165. See id. at 534-35 (explaining that a general, valid law which is applicable to
everyone, yet incidentally burdens some citizens’ exercise of religion, is
constitutional, unless motivated by bigotry or an impermissible legislative motive).
166. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 875, 877 (1990) (detailing the various
practices and acts involved in religions such as:  “assembling with others for a worship
service, participating in sacramental use of bread and wine, proselytizing, [and]
abstaining from certain foods or certain modes of transportation”).  Writing for the
majority, Justice Scalia stated that a law that bans acts that are only performed for
religious purposes is unconstitutional, whereas a law that exists for the protection of
society, which only incidentally affects religious acts, would be constitutional.  See id.
167. See id. at 888-89 (stating that requiring a “compelling state interest” to
prohibit certain religious acts would set a dangerous precedent that would effectively
provide religious exemptions from almost every civil obligation).
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believe that homosexuality or bisexuality is immoral and should be
changed.168  If parents act consistent with this belief in violation of an
otherwise valid law, however, they could be subject to government
regulation.169  Similarly, a court ruling or legislative interpretation
that “reparative” therapy is a form of child abuse, or more likely a
form of neglect,170 would be constitutional because the child abuse
and neglect laws that a court would interpret are passed for the
protection of children and society.171  These laws are not passed to
prevent an act that is only engaged in for religious purposes.172  This
law would only be unconstitutional if its enactment or decision was
motivated by religious bigotry.173
If a court interprets “reparative” therapy as constituting emotional
abuse,174 as defined in a child abuse and neglect statute, it would be
interpreting a valid state law that was passed without any religious
                                                 
168. See generally Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 171 (1944) (holding that a
mother who used her children to disseminate religious materials could be
prosecuted under child labor laws, despite her religious beliefs).  Under this
reasoning, a parent could be prosecuted for acting on his or her religious beliefs that
homosexuality is immoral.
169. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 878-79 (explaining that an individual must comply with
state law regardless of his or her religious beliefs); see also Gillette v. United States,
401 U.S. 437, 462 (1971) (upholding the federal government’s right to compel those
who object to war to fight despite the religious nature of their objections).
170. See Child Maltreatment Urban Justice Center Memo (Urban Justice Center,
New York, N.Y.), Oct. 5, 1998, at 67-69  (on file with American University Law Review)
(discussing the New York State Family Court Act and child abuse cases and
suggesting that “reparative” therapy is more likely to be considered neglect than
abuse).  This internal memo suggests that whether a parent’s conduct constitutes
“protracted impairment of the emotional health” of a child will be a difficult
determination and will require a psychiatrist or psychologist.  See id. at 69.  It is
suggested that the result is more likely to be a finding of neglect than abuse.  See id.
171. See id. at 67-69; see also Collin Gotham, A Proposed Solution for False Memory
Cases:  A Cross Negligence Standard, 8 KAN. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 205, 211 (1999) (stating
that “child abuse laws in this country exist not to promote reports by individuals who
are now adults of abuse . . . but to protect minors from further abuse”); Ellen
Marnus, Please Keep My Secret:  Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, Confidentiality, and Juvenile
Delinquency, 11 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHICS 509, 514 (1998) (noting that “[c]hild abuse laws,
as do most laws concerning children in society, stem from society’s need to protect
children”).
172. See N.Y. FAM. LAW § 111 commentary, at 6 (McKinney 1999) (stating that the
purpose of the Family Court system is to act as a “special agency for the care and
protection of the young and the preservation of the family” (quoting The Family
Court Act, 1962 N.Y. Laws 3420)).
173. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hiaheah, 508 U.S. 520,
533 (1993) (holding that a law was not neutral, and was thus unconstitutional,
because it targeted a religious belief).  In Lukumi Babalu Aye, the Court invalidated a
city ordinance prohibiting the slaughter of animals because it found that the
ordinance was intended to suppress Santerian worship services.  See id. at 533.
174. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 1012(h) (McKinney 1983) (defining “emotional
abuse” as “a state of diminished psychological or intellectual functioning in relation
to, but not limited to, such factors as failure to thrive, control of aggressiveness or
self-destructive impulses, ability to think or reason, or acting out or misbehavior”).
1999] “REPARATIVE” THERAPY 535
bigotry or impermissible legislative motivation.175  Thus, a free
exercise claim under the First Amendment would not be a valid
defense for parents who attempt to change their child’s sexual
orientation against the will of that child.176  Furthermore, the
Supreme Court has said that a law which is not neutral and generally
applicable, and has been directed at a religious practice, is not per se
unconstitutional; it may be justified by a compelling state interest that
is narrowly tailored to advance that law’s purpose.177
2. The parental autonomy rights
a. Origins and current law
Just as the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment is not
absolute, neither is parental autonomy in raising one’s child.178  In
Meyer v. Nebraska,179 the Supreme Court recognized the importance of
parental autonomy in raising children.180  Meyer involved a man who
taught a young boy German in violation of a state law that prohibited
the teaching of foreign languages.181  The Court decided that because
learning German did not hurt the child’s health, morality, or
                                                 
175. There is no indication that religious bigotry is present in passing child abuse
and neglect statutes.  Quite the contrary, there is evidence that religion is considered
favorably.  In Pennsylvania’s child abuse and neglect statute, the legislature stated
that “such commitment shall be made, to select, so far as it may be possible, families
of the same religious denomination as that to which the parents of children
committed to its care shall belong.” See PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 11, § 31 (West 1999)
(favoring placement of child in foster care with a family from the same religion as
child’s family).
176. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 877, 889 (1990) (holding that a state’s
criminal law, as applied to the respondent’s ingestion of peyote, did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause).
177. See Lukumi Babalu Aye, 508 U.S. at 546 (ruling that a law directed at a specific
religious practice is not per se unconstitutional, but rather, the law will be
constitutional if it survives strict scrutiny); cf. Goldman v. Weinberger, 475 U.S. 503,
504 (1986) (holding that the military’s interest in preserving a uniform dress code
outweighed petitioner’s First Amendment right to wear a yarmulke).
178. See Lee TT. v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 710-13 (1996) (balancing a parent’s
liberty interest against the state’s interest in regulating child abuse).  The court in Lee
held that parents who are accused of abusing children have a due process interest in
not being “branded” as abusers by having their names appear on a central register of
child abuses without sufficient investigation of the claims.  See id.
179. 262 U.S. 390 (1923).
180. See id. at 400 (stating that a teacher’s right to instruct a child in German, and
a parent’s right to “engage him” to do so, are protected by the Fourteenth
Amendment); see also Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745 (1982) (recognizing that
“freedom of personal choice in matters of family life is a fundamental liberty interest
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment”).
181. See id. at 396-97 (explaining that the teacher was convicted of violating a
Nebraska law criminalizing instruction of a foreign language to children who had not
completed the eighth grade).  The law was intended to preserve English as the
national language by ensuring that all school children were educated in English.  See
id.
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understanding, it could not be against the law.182  A few years later,
the Court reaffirmed this rationale in Pierce v. Society of the Sisters of the
Holy Names of Jesus and Mary,183 in which it decided that parents have
autonomy under the Fourteenth Amendment with regard to raising
their children.184  In Pierce, the State of Oregon passed a law that
required attendance at a public school for all children in a certain
age group.185  The appellees, the Society of the Sisters and Hill
Military Academy, would have had to close their private schools as a
result of enforcement of this law.186  The Court determined that the
law was void and stated that “the child is not a mere creature of the
state; those who nurture him and direct his destiny have the right,
coupled with the high duty, to recognize and prepare him for
additional obligations.”187
A parent’s Fourteenth Amendment rights, however, are not
absolute.  For example, courts have found the state’s interest
compelling enough to permit regulation in child labor,188 in
mandatory school attendance,189 and in child abuse.190  In Lee T.T. v.
                                                 
182. See id. at 403 (dismissing the argument that the statute was enacted to protect
the health of children because the statute only prohibited instruction in foreign
languages, not any other subject matter that presumably could have been equally
injurious).
183. 268 U.S. 510 (1925).
184. See id. at 534-35 (deciding that under the doctrine of Meyer, an Oregon law
requiring parents to send their children to public schools interfered with the
parents’ Fourteenth Amendment right to direct the upbringing of their child).
185. See id. at 530-34 (providing the text of the Compulsory Education Act, which
required that any person having custody of a child between the ages of 8 and 16 to
send the child to public school, and providing that every day the child missed would
be a misdemeanor).
186. See id. at 531-34 (explaining that the Society of the Sisters, which operated an
orphanage, several private religious schools, and the Hill Military Academy, would be
destroyed if all Oregon children were compelled to attend public schools).
187. Id. at 535; see Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 158 (1944) (“Neither
rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond limitation.”); see also Parents
United For Better Sch., Inc. v. School Dist., 978 F. Supp. 197, 212 (E.D. Pa. 1997)
(holding that a condom distribution program did not violate parents’ liberty
interest).
188. See Sturges v. Beauchamp, 231 U.S. 320, 326 (1913) (upholding a state law
prohibiting employment of children under 16 years of age); People v. Ewer, 36 N.E.
4, 6 (N.Y. 1894) (holding a state law that prohibited children from being exhibited in
the theater and in other occupations as a valid exercise of the state’s legislative
power).  But see Farias v. New York, 421 N.Y.S.2d 753, 756 (Sup. Ct. 1979) (declaring
that juveniles are not prohibited by law from performing in “The Greatest Show on
Earth,” Ringling Bros.-Barnum & Baily Circus, despite a New York law prohibiting
exhibition of a child without a permit from the Mayor).  The court in Farias found
that a “blanket prohibition against children under sixteen performing as acrobats,
gymnasts, etc.” was too vague and outdated to be constitutional.  See id. at 756-57.
The court held that because the children’s circus performance did not bear a
reasonable relationship to the public health, safety, or morals, the statute prohibiting
such performance should not be enforced.  See id.
189. See State v. Bailey, 61 N.E. 730, 731-32 (Ind. 1901) (holding that a law which
required every parent to send their children to school was not an unauthorized
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Dowling,191 the highest court of New York decided that “the laws
against child abuse and child neglect are an implicit recognition that
even the rights of parents are not absolute and that society, through
its courts and social service agencies, should intervene to protect
endangered children.”192  When the state does decide to intervene,
however, they must meet certain procedural due process
requirements.193  The stringent procedural requirements are in place
because of the fundamental liberty interest that parents have in the
care, custody, and management of their children.194  The state will
have to meet these procedural requirements by clear and convincing
evidence to remove the child or children from the abusive
parent(s).195
b. Parental rights in the area of mental health
In Parham v. J.R.,196 the Supreme Court granted broad power to
parents when placing their children involuntarily in mental
hospitals.197  In Parham, the Court decided that if there is a “neutral
fact finder” to evaluate a parent’s decision regarding
institutionalization, a child’s due process rights are not violated when
he or she is institutionalized by a parent.198  The Court held that
parents should have a dominant, but not absolute, role in the
                                                 
invasion of the natural right of the parent because parents’ rights are “subordinate to
the power of the state”).
190. See Chayo v. Kaladjian, 844 F. Supp. 163, 172 (S.D.N.Y. 1994) (“Even in the
absence of parental consent or judicial order, children may be removed from their
parent’s custody without a violation of due process when the removal is taken as an
emergency measure to protect the child’s interest.”).
191. 87 N.Y.2d 699 (1996).
192. Id. at 710.
193. See Santosky v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 754 (1982) (adopting a test established
in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), which requires a balancing of:  the private
interests affected; the risk of error created by the state’s procedure; and a
countervailing government interest).
194. See Santosky, 455 U.S. at 753 (“The fundamental liberty interest of natural
parents . . . does not evaporate simply because they have not been model parents or
have lost temporary custody of their child to the State.  Even when blood
relationships are strained, parents retain a vital interest in preventing the
irretrievable destruction of their family life.”).
195. See id. at 769 (explaining that a majority of the states have adopted the clear
and convincing standard of proof and that such a standard is appropriate to satisfy
due process).
196. 442 U.S. 584 (1979).
197. See id. at 604 (holding that parents should retain “plenary authority” to
institutionalize their children for psychological disorders, “subject to an independent
medical judgment”).
198. See id. at 605-07 (stating that a child’s interests may best be protected by the
presence of a neutral party to review a parent’s decision).  But cf. Vitek v. Jones, 445
U.S. 480, 494 (1980) (holding that the transfer of a prison inmate to a mental
hospital for behavior modification violates due process).
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decision to commit their child where no evidence of parental abuse
or neglect is present.199  The Court determined that the neutral fact
finder must use medical standards in evaluating whether the child
should be committed.200  Because the American Psychiatric
Association, the APA, the American Psychoanalytic Association, and
the American Academy of Pediatrics all reject the notion of
“reparative” therapy,201 and because homosexuality has not been
classified as a mental illness since 1973,202 a neutral fact finder relying
on “traditional medical techniques” should  find a parent’s
commitment of a homosexual child for “reparative” therapy
inappropriate.203
3. Parent autonomy claim together with free exercise claim
a. Current state of these claims
It is well established that where no other constitutional right is
compromised, a valid state law that only incidentally interferes with
someone’s religious practice does not violate the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.204  Similarly, the very existence of
state child abuse laws demonstrates that parents’ autonomy rights are
not absolute.205  When a constitutional right (e.g., the First
                                                 
199. See Parham, 442 U.S. at 604 (presuming that parents generally act in the best
interest of their children).
200. See id.
201. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (discussing these medical
organizations’ positions condoning “reparative” or conversion therapy).
202. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 48 (noting that because the APA and
American Psychiatric Association voted that homosexuality was not a disorder in the
1970s, most therapists have abandoned the “sexual conversion” business); see also
Goishi, supra note 59, at 1154 (naming 1973 as the year homosexuality was removed
from the DSM); Rosin, supra note 59, at A14 (mentioning the 1973 landmark
decision by the American Psychiatric Association to declassify homosexuality as a
mental illness).
203. If the parents are explicit in their desire to convert their child’s sexual
orientation, Parham establishes enough safeguards for the child.  See 442 U.S. at 608
(emphasizing that commitment decisions should represent an independent
judgment and that medical resources, including behavioral specialists, should be
consulted).  If the parents say their child is not conforming to gender typical norms,
however, e.g., their son is effeminate or their daughter is a tomboy, the child loses all
of those protections because Gender Identity Disorder is still considered a mental
illness.  See DSM, supra notes 137-41 and accompanying text.
204. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 875, 879 (1990) (holding that the
Free Exercise Clause did not prohibit enforcement of a state law banning the use of
peyote, even in Native American religious ceremonies); Minersville Sch. Dist. Bd. of
Educ. v. Gobitis, 310 U.S. 586, 594-95 (1940) (holding that one’s religious beliefs do
not excuse a person from complying with laws enacted without bias and for the
public good).
205. See Lee TT v. Dowling, 87 N.Y.2d 699, 710 (1996) (noting the importance of
state intervention, even in family matters, to protect children in danger).
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Amendment) is coupled with another right (e.g., the parental
autonomy right), however, a state’s interest is judged by a higher
standard than where only one right is present.206  Therefore, the rule
pronounced in Smith and reaffirmed in Flores arguably is not
applicable precedent because both cases involved only one right,
whereas many “reparative” therapy cases are likely to involve two
rights.207
Wisconsin v. Yoder208 involved both the parental autonomy right
claim and a free exercise of religion claim.209  The Supreme Court, in
deciding whether Amish children could be compelled to attend
public school until the age of sixteen, decided that a free exercise
claim coupled with “the traditional interest of parents with respect to
the religious upbringing of their children” was strong enough to
trump the state law requiring attendance.210  The Court stated that
“however strong the state’s interest in universal compulsory
education, it is by no means absolute to the exclusion or
subordination of all other interests.”211
The Court’s major concern in Yoder was that the enforcement of
the compulsory attendance law would “gravely endanger if not
destroy the free exercise of respondents’ religious beliefs.”212  The
Court was reluctant to find the state’s interest in this law compelling
enough to lead to the possible elimination of the Amish religion.213
b. Distinguishing Yoder from cases involving “reparative” therapy
Yoder is distinguishable from a case of “reparative” therapy.  First,
with regard to Christianity, “reparative” therapy is not a “basic
                                                 
206. See Smith, 494 U.S. at 881 (noting that if a law offends both the Free Exercise
Clause and another constitutional right, i.e., freedom of speech, the First
Amendment will preclude application of the statute).
207. When a parent places his or her child in “reparative” therapy, parental
autonomy is always at issue, and frequently the free exercise of religion is involved as
well.  See supra Part IV.D.1.b (discussing free exercise of religion and “reparative”
therapy).
208. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
209. See id. at 209 (noting that the plaintiffs claimed that a compulsory attendance
law violated their First and Fourteenth Amendment rights).
210. See id. at 214 (noting that a court must balance a state’s interest in universal
education with an individual’s fundamental rights).
211. Id. at 215 (stating that only the highest state interests can “overbalance
legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion”).
212. Id. at 219 (stating that this concern was based on the teachings of educational
and religious history).
213. See id. at 216.  The Court stated that with regard to the Old Order Amish
people, religion is not just a matter of theocratic belief but is “an entire way of life,
regulating with it the detail of Talmudic diet through the strictly enforced rules of
the church community.”  Id.
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religious tenants and practice of the . . . [Christian] faith”214 because
most Christian faiths do not condone “reparative” therapy, and some
speak out directly against it.215  Second, unlike the Amish, there is no
ultimatum posed to a Christian to either assimilate into society at
large or abandon his or her religion upon a finding that “reparative”
therapy constitutes child abuse and neglect.216  Third, the Amish
“beliefs and attitudes towards life, family and home have remained
constant—perhaps some would say static—in a period of unparalleled
progress in human knowledge . . .”217 whereas the idea of “reparative”
therapy is a recent belief and attitude held by only a small portion of
Christian faiths.218  Last, the children in Yoder agreed with their
parents and did not want to attend school, whereas in the context of
“reparative” therapy the children are often involuntarily placed.219
Furthermore, the Court in Yoder suggested that the state’s interest
in education would be compelling enough to defeat the parents’
rights had the children been completely lacking in knowledge.220  “No
one can question the State’s duty to protect children from ignorance
                                                 
214. See id. at 218 (noting that the effects of integrating children into the secular
world can be destructive to the Amish religious institution).
215. See Calculated Compassion, supra note 13, at Executive Summary (noting that
the views of the “ex-gay” movement and Christian Right leaders are not shared by
mainstream religious organizations, including the Roman Catholic Church, The
National Council of Churches, the United Methodist Church, the American Jewish
Congress, and the Union of American Hebrew Congregations); see also Letter from
Charles L. Cox, Executive Director, Dignity/USA, to Kerry Lobel, Executive Director,
National Gay and Lesbian Task Force (Aug. 14, 1998) (on file with the National Gay
and Lesbian Task Force) (discussing a faith based anti-gay-violence initiative called
The Solidarity Sunday Project).  The letter explains that over 1,200 individuals and
faith communities are participants in the initiative, and asks the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force to join because of “the escalating violence against lesbians, gay
men, bisexuals, and transgender persons.”  See id. at 1.  The letter refers to the full
page ads taken out by the “ex-gay” movement in the New York Times, Washington Post,
and USA Today as “questioning the value of our very existence,” and adding “[i]t is
ads like these that inspire hate crimes.”  See id.
216. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 218 (noting that the mandatory attendance law, in
practice, will give the Amish the ultimatum of abandoning their faith or
assimilating).
217. Id. at 216.
218. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 47 (naming July 13, 1998, as
approximately the time the “reparative” therapy campaign began); see also Calculated
Compassion, supra note 13, at Executive Summary (naming religious leaders and faiths
that oppose “reparative” therapy).
219. See Yoder, 205 U.S. at 237 (Stewart, J., concurring) (remarking that had the
children’s religious beliefs differed from their parents’ beliefs, there would have
been an “interesting and important issue” before the Court which was not present
and therefore, did not need to be addressed).
220. See id. at 222.  See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)
(requiring the Amish to participate, over their religious objections, in the social
security system in deference to Congress’ judgment that only self-employed Amish
people should be exempted from paying the tax).
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but this argument does not square with the facts disclosed in the
record.”221
The Court’s ruling in Yoder should be construed narrowly to apply
only to the facts present in the case and not as a broad and absolute
grant of religious freedom and parental autonomy in raising their
children.222  A thorough analysis of Yoder leaves open the question of
Yoder’s precedential value in a case where there is evidence that a gay,
lesbian, bisexual, or transgender child has been abused or neglected
in the name of religion.223
c. Solving the unanswered question in Yoder
The Supreme Court has focused on a state’s interest in the way
children are raised and has held that parental autonomy and free
exercise of religion are not absolute, but rather that they can be
defeated where there is a compelling government interest.224  In
Prince v. Massachusetts225 the Court held:
                                                 
221. Yoder, 406 U.S. at 222.  The state argued, and the Court agreed, that just as
Thomas Jefferson pointed out early in our country’s history, “some degree of
education is necessary to prepare citizens to participate effectively and intelligently in
our open political system if we are to preserve freedom and independence.”  Id.
222. See James C. Farrell, Johnny Can’t Read or Write, But Just Watch Him Work:
Assessing the Constitutionality of Mandatory High School Community Service Programs, 71 ST.
JOHN’S L. REV. 795, 837 (1997) (describing the decision in Yoder as restricted to
“long-established organized groups that can demonstrate commitment to an
established way of life”).
223. The court in Yoder specifically noted that the case is not one involving “harm
to the physical or mental health of the child,” suggesting that such circumstances
would warrant a different result.  See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 230.
224. See Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166 (1944) (determining whether a
state has a right to act on behalf of its young citizens and concluding that “the family
itself is not beyond regulation in the public interest, as against a claim of religious
liberty. . . . [a]nd neither rights of religion nor rights of parenthood are beyond
limitation.”).  The Prince Court discussed cases where the Court upheld a state law
despite a claim of parental autonomy or religious conviction.  See id.  The Court
maintained that a state is permitted to restrict a parent’s rights by requiring school
attendance and regulating child labor.  See id.  The Court also explicitly stated that a
religious conviction does not nullify the state’s authority.  See id.  The Court further
noted that requiring vaccinations is one example of an area where the state
supercedes parental rights, even when coupled with religious conviction, because the
right to practice religion does not include exposing the community to a
communicable disease or possible death.  See id. at 166-67.  The Court concluded this
discussion by noting that “[i]t is sufficient to show what indeed appellant hardly
disputes, that the state has a wide range of power for limiting parental freedom and
authority in things affecting the child’s welfare; and that this includes, to some
extent, matters of conscience and religious conviction.”  Id. at 167; see also Bowen v.
Roy, 476 U.S. 693, 696, 712 (1982) (holding a federal law requiring people to have
social security numbers to participate in government programs did not violate the
Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment even where the parents who were
contesting the law believed that requiring social security numbers would destroy the
spirit of their young child).
225. 321 U.S. 158 (1944).
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A democratic society rests, for its continuance, upon the healthy,
well-rounded growth of young people into full maturity as citizens,
with all that implies . . . .  It is too late now to doubt that legislation
appropriately designed to reach such evils is within the state’s
police power, whether against the parent’s claim to control of the
child or one that religious scruples dictate contrary action.226
Therefore, examining cases where the state has a compelling
interest illustrates that a parent’s right, even when coupled with a
religious conviction, is not absolute.227  For example, in Prince the
compelling state interest defeated both the parental autonomy claim
and the Free Exercise of religion claim.228
A court in New York also found that the state’s interest can trump
parents’ Fourteenth Amendment rights to raise their children, even
when accompanied by the First Amendment claim of Free Exercise of
Religion.  In In re Sampson,229 the court held that a fifteen-year-old boy
was neglected when his mother, because she was a Jehovah’s Witness,
refused to provide him with appropriate medical and surgical care.230
The court stated that although the mother’s religious objection was
founded upon the scriptures and sincerely held, it nevertheless was
defeated by the state’s paramount duty to insure the child’s health
and safety. The court held that “[p]arents may be free to become
martyrs themselves.  But it does not follow they are free, in identical
circumstances, to make martyrs of their children before they have
                                                 
226. Id. at 168 (noting that the state has broader power over children than over
adults).
227. See id. at 166 (discussing the Court’s role as parens patrial, acting in the
general well-being of children); see also Hoener v. Bertinato, 171 A.2d 140, 143-45
(Bergen County Ct. 1961) (holding that a state has the right to declare a child
neglected and to grant custody where the parents refuse a blood transfusion for their
unborn child on religious grounds); Raleigh Fitkin-Paul Morgan Mem’l Hosp. v.
Anderson, 201 A.2d 537, 538 (N.J. 1964) (holding that a mother’s refusal to have a
blood transfusion for her unborn child because of her religious beliefs will be
trumped by the authority of the hospital if the doctors determine it is medically
necessary at the time of birth).
228. See Prince, 321 U.S. at 166-71 (discussing the important state interest of child
protection); see also State v. Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197, 200 (Ind. 1904) (convicting
father of manslaughter for failing to provide lifesaving medical care to his son).  In
Chenoweth, the father had followed his religious beliefs, and the court held that a
parent must provide his or her child with medical assistance to relieve or cure the
child of disease, regardless of whether the parent believes that it is against the
teachings of the Bible and that prayer is a cure for all disease.  See id. at 199-200.
229. 317 N.Y.S.2d 641 (Fam. Ct. 1970).
230. See id. at 652 (determining that a mother’s religious objections to her son’s
surgery and possible blood transfusion were “untenable,” and ordering her to permit
her son to undergo surgery).  But see In re Green, 448 Pa. 338, 349 (1972) (declining
to find the parent’s medical decision outweighed by the state’s interest where the
child’s life is not in immediate danger).
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reached the age of full and legal discretion when they can make that
choice for themselves.”231
CONCLUSION
Given the current hostile climate to gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender people in society,232 the legislature233 and the
courtrooms,234 the chances of a judge extending protection against
child abuse and neglect in a situation involving “reparative” therapy is
highly unlikely.  Whether a court or legislature would ever extend
protection to juveniles subjected to “reparative” therapy may turn in
part on the jurisdiction and community in which the juvenile
resides.235  If a jurisdiction already prohibits discrimination against
gays and lesbians in employment, public accommodations, education,
housing, credit practices, and union practices, then it is more likely
that the jurisdiction will protect gay, lesbian, bisexual, and
transgender youths from “reparative” therapy.236
                                                 
231. Id. (quoting Prince, 321 U.S. at 170).
232. See, e.g., From Wrongs to Rights:  Public Opinion on Gay and Lesbian Americans
Moves Toward Equality, NGLTF Newsletter (Policy Institute of the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force, Washington, D.C.), July 1998, at 14-15 (analyzing societal
opinions of gay men and lesbians and noting that only 35% of Americans support
same-sex marriage, and only 40% support adoption rights for gays and lesbians).
More generally, the report measured the public’s feelings toward gays and lesbians
and found that the mean score for feeling favorable towards gays and lesbians was
forty out of one hundred.  See id. at 19.  This statistic is one indication that the
American public does not favorably view gays and lesbians.  See id. at 20.  Further, the
report showed that there was a 52% disapproval rate of gay and lesbian “lifestyles.”
See id. at 21.
233. See Leland & Miller, supra note 8, at 47-48 (assessing the overall climate in the
105th Congress and noting that Senate Majority Leader Trent Lott likened gays and
lesbians to kleptomaniacs and alcoholics and blocked a Senate vote on the
nomination of James Hormel, an openly gay man, to be ambassador to
Luxembourg).
234. See Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (upholding sodomy law and
honoring the Georgia electorate’s decision “that homosexual sodomy is immoral and
unacceptable”); Equality Found. v. City of Cincinnati, 128 F.3d 289, 301 (6th Cir.)
(determining that the removal of gays, lesbians, and bisexuals from the ranks of
those protected by the Cincinnati Charter Amendment was not a discriminatory
measure because it was rationally related to the city’s economic interests), cert. denied,
119 S. Ct. 365 (1998); Desantis v. Pacific Tel. & Tel. Co., 608 F.2d 327, 330-33 (9th
Cir. 1979) (holding that Title VII does not prohibit discrimination based on sexual
orientation); Ward v. Ward, 742 So. 2d 250, 252-54 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996)
(granting custody of a child to a man who murdered his first wife so that the mother,
a lesbian, would not have custody).  But see Romer v. Evans, 517 U.S. 620, 635 (1996)
(holding that a state is not permitted to pass a law that discriminates against gays and
lesbians by making them inferior to everyone else).
235. See generally Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual & Transgender Civil Rights Laws in the U.S.,
NGLTF Newsletter (Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force,
Washington, D.C.), June 1998, at i (discussing the likelihood that a state or locality
would pass pro-gay legislation based upon the nature of prior civil rights laws passed
by states and municipalities).
236. See id.
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If a case involving a child involuntarily subjected to “reparative”
therapy was before a non-hostile court there would be ample
precedent for a finding of child abuse and neglect.237  A judge would
likely acknowledge that a reasonably prudent parent238 would not
subject his or her child to treatment that the mainstream medical
community has warned is dangerous.239  Further, a judge would have
to acknowledge that the state child abuse statute includes emotional
or mental abuse.240  The court would then look to case law ordering a
parent to be aware of, and to act in accordance with, his or her
child’s particular needs.241  If a parent places his or her child in
“reparative” therapy for religious reasons, there is precedent holding
that the state’s interest in the well-being of its young citizens is strong
enough to defeat both a parental autonomy claim and a free exercise
of religion claim.242
After determining that the child is neglected, the state should
notify the parents that they must make diligent efforts to eradicate
the homophobia within their home before the state will permit the
child to be returned.243  In finding either temporary or long-term
placement for the child, the court should seriously consider placing
the child with a lesbian or gay couple.244
                                                 
237. See supra Part III.A.3 (examining standards used in child abuse and neglect
cases).  See generally AREEN, supra note 131 (recording a decision that a parents’
motive for punishing a child is irrelevant to whether a child abuse statute was
violated, no matter how sincerely held and regardless of whether the court is
sympathetic); In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 652 (stressing that no matter how
genuine a parent’s belief, such belief may be less than the State’s interest).
238. See supra Part III.B (discussing reasonably prudent parent standard).
239. See supra notes 33-39 and accompanying text (explaining the condemnation
of “reparative” therapy by such organizations as the APA and the American
Psychiatric Association.
240. See supra notes 62-66 and accompanying text (chronicling the emotional and
mental abuse in state child abuse and neglect statutes).
241. See supra Part III.A.3 (discussing cases charging parents with the duty of
recognizing their child’s special needs).
242. See supra Part IV.D; see also In re Sampson, 317 N.Y.S.2d 641, 653 (Fam. Ct.
1970) (providing an overview of cases in which the court found the states’ interest
sufficiently compelling to override the parents’ right to raise their child); State v.
Chenoweth, 71 N.E. 197, 200 (Ind. 1904) (finding a parent guilty of manslaughter
for withholding medical care from his son despite the fact that the father claimed
that he believed the Bible and prayer would heal his son).
243. See supra Part IV.B (discussing judicial holding that parents must remove
hostile conditions that led to the removal of the child after a finding of abuse in
order for them to be reunited).
244. See Nancy Polikoff, Resisting “Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell” in the Licensing of Lesbian
and Gay Foster Parents:  Why Openness Will Benefit Lesbian and Gay Youth, 48 HASTINGS
L.J. 1183, 1184-87 (1997) (providing multiple reasons why a gay or lesbian child
would benefit from living with a same-sex couple).  Professor Polikoff states:
The most obvious connection between lesbian and gay youth and foster
parents is the importance of the availability of gay and lesbian foster parents
to provide homes for gay teenagers who need acceptance and support for
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A major reason why courts have not been receptive to gay, lesbian,
bisexual, and transgender issues historically is because of the
pervasive belief in the legal system that gays and lesbians are
immoral.245  Because the role of the courts is to interpret laws, which
were created based on a shared social vision of morality,246 the gay
liberation movement may not achieve true success unless the
discourse of gay liberation shifts from a rights-based theory247 to a
moral-based argument.248  If right-wing, Christian, political
                                                 
their journey into adulthood.  But the open, publicly acknowledged and
valued existence of gay foster parents serves another function.  The state
agency that licenses foster parents is the same agency that controls the lives
of lesbian and gay youth in its care.  Open licensing of gay foster parents
sends a powerful message to those youth that it’s okay to be gay, and we need
the state to send that message in as many ways as possible.
Id. at 1184.
245. See infra notes 249-52 and accompanying text (discussing the general animus
toward homosexuals and the perceived immorality of homosexuality); see also Bowers
v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (noting Georgia’s sodomy law is predicated
upon a widely held view that sodomy is immoral).
246. See Feldblum, supra note 1, at 241 (“The role of government is to legislate
based on a shared social vision of morality.”).  The logical extension is that if the
courts interpret laws that the legislatures produce, then the courts are interpreting
laws based on a shared vision of morality.
The Washington Post conducted a poll showing that most Americans prefer
defending the community’s standards of right and wrong over protecting the rights
of individuals to live by their own moral standards.  See Dan Balz, Picking up Votes in
a Maze of Ideas, Wash. Post, Oct. 5, 1998, at A8.  The conclusions made in this article
indicate that whole communities will have to view discrimination against gays and
lesbians as wrong before pro-gay bills gain support in the legislatures.
247. See URVASHI VAID, VIRTUAL EQUALITY:  THE MAINSTREAMING OF GAY AND LESBIAN
LIBERATION 179 (1995) (discussing the shortcomings of a movement based on a civil
rights paradigm).  Vaid points out that “a rights-oriented movement can coexist with
prejudice against lesbians and gay men” and can even progress without dismantling
homophobia.  See id.  Although Vaid does not recommend either completely
abandoning the rights-oriented model or adopting a moral argument, she does
advocate an expansion of equality to the point of gay civil rights being seen as part of
a broader human right along with sexual and gender equality, social and economic
justice, and faith in a multiracial society.  See id.
248. See Feldblum, supra note 1, at 241 (arguing that legislation based on shared
morality would further gay liberation in ways that legislation based on equal rights
could not).  Professor Feldblum argues for a “gay is good” message:
[T]he role of government is to legislate based on a shared social vision of
morality.  Again, put most simply, laws and judicial decisions prohibiting
discrimination based on sexual orientation would be justified under this view
if society were to accept that it is immoral to force an individual to deny the
integrity of his or her sexual orientation, and further, if society would come
to believe that homosexual love embodies the same moral goods as does
heterosexual love.
Id.; see also Capitol Hill Update, WASH. BLADE, Mar. 12, 1999, at 29 (discussing a
gathering of over 120 civil liberties advocates).  The article reports that Professor
Feldblum led a discussion on what opponents to gay rights have decided to use as
their message.  She said they want to say that homosexuality is destructive and
unhealthy.  She also noted that polling numbers show that most Americans believe
gays are immoral.  She believes the best way to counter these messages and educate
people is by showing that gays are “healthy and moral because they embrace their
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organizations are permitted to have the only say on what is and is not
moral, then gay, lesbian, bisexual and transgender people are not
going to receive the protection they need from the legal system.249
One of the best examples of how the morality argument has
worked against gay and lesbian civil rights is in Bowers v. Hardwick.250
In Hardwick, the Supreme Court claimed that the majority of the
population of Georgia believed homosexuality was immoral and
affirmed the practice of basing laws on morality.251  Regarding the
morality of homosexuality, the Court in Hardwick stated:
The law, however, is constantly based on notions of morality, and if
all laws representing essentially moral choices are to be invalidated
under the Due Process Clause, the courts will be very busy indeed.
Even respondent makes no such claim, but insists that majority
sentiments about the morality of homosexuality should be declared
inadequate.  We do not agree, and are unpersuaded that the sodomy
laws of some 25 states should be invalidated on this basis.252
Since the Supreme Court decided Hardwick in 1986, it has been
cited as authority to deny gays and lesbians numerous civil rights.253
                                                 
sexual orientation.”  See id. (emphasis in original).
249. An example of what the right-wing political organizations say about the
morality of homosexuality is presented by a letter distributed by the organization
called Focus on the Family.  See Letter from James Dobson, Executive Director, Focus
on the Family, to Focus on the Family Membership (June 1998) (visited Mar. 30, 2000)
<http://www.family.org/docstudy/newsletters/a0001935.html> (discussing the
relationship between conservative Christian groups such as Focus on the Family, and
homosexuals).  Dobson claims that the gay civil rights movement has a radical social
agenda that threatens society in general and the family in particular.  See id.  The
letter stresses that “[a]ny nation that mocks the laws of God will ultimately fail.”  Id.
Dobson believes that “homosexuality is immoral and contrary to God’s plan for the
human family.”  Id.  He advocates that his followers direct homosexuals to groups
such as Exodus International, where they can be delivered from the homosexual
lifestyle.  See id.  He says there is “great suffering among homosexuals, and it is our
desire to show compassion and concern for those caught in that lifestyle.”  Id.; see also
Finnis, supra note 6, at 1054 (discussing Finnis’ belief in the immorality of
homosexuality).
250. 478 U.S. 186, 196 (1986) (holding that a rational basis exists for a Georgia
sodomy law).  This decision illustrates how the moral view of homosexuality
influences, if not determines, the way the legal system responds to gay, lesbian, and
bisexual legal issues.  See id.
251. See id. (noting that 25 states have sodomy laws).
252. Id. (emphasis added).
253. See, e.g., High Tech Gays v. Defense Indus. Sec. Clearance Office, 895 F.2d
563, 571 (9th Cir. 1990) (noting that Hardwick determined that homosexual activity
is not a fundamental right, and ultimately determining that Department of Defense’s
practice of examining the background of gay and lesbian applicants was not a
violation of the Constitution); Ben-Shalom v. Marsh, 881 F.2d 454, 461 (7th Cir.
1989) (upholding a U.S. Army practice of disqualifying homosexuals from service,
citing Hardwick for support); Woodward v. United States, 871 F.2d 1068, 1076 (Fed.
Cir. 1989) (citing Hardwick to support the proposition that discrimination against
homosexuals does not violate the Constitution); Padula v. Webster, 822 F.2d 97, 103
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (basing decision to uphold FBI’s refusal to hire a homosexual on
Hardwick, and noting that the decision “forecloses appellant’s efforts to gain suspect
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Holding such strong precedential value, Hardwick continues to
convey the idea that homosexuality is immoral.254  It is for this reason
that the gay liberation movement should engage in the morality
argument.255  What engaging in the morality argument means in the
context of “reparative” therapy is that the gay liberation movement
will have to explain to the courts and legislatures why it is necessary,
and morally right, to protect gay, lesbian, bisexual, and transgender
youths.
                                                 
class status for practicing homosexuals”); In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21,
27 (N.H. 1987) (relying on Hardwick to find that a proposed bill prohibiting
homosexuals from adopting children, being licensed as foster care parents, or from
running daycare centers does not violate any substantive right to privacy); Missouri v.
Walsh, 713 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Mo. 1986) (citing Hardwick for the proposition that no
fundamental right to engage in homosexual behavior exists); see also WILLIAM B.
RUBENSTEIN, SEXUAL ORIENTATION AND THE LAW 668 (2d ed. 1997) (explaining that
Hardwick has also been used, in at least six cases, to conclude that classification based
on sexual orientation deserves no more than rational basis review).
254. See RUBENSTEIN, supra note 253, at 668 (outlining the strong precedential
“value” of Hardwick).
255. See generally Peter M. Cicchino, Reason and the Rule of Law:  Should Bare
Assertions of “Public Morality” Qualify as Legitimate Government Interests for the Purposes of
Equal Protection Review?, 87 GEO. L.J. 139, 140 (1998) (arguing that the bare public
morality does not have any force because it is inadequate if it lacks empirical
connection to the public welfare).  Public welfare is defined as a good such as health,
safety, or economic prosperity.  See id. at 141.  Professor Cicchino argues that the
bare morality argument is being proposed as a legitimate government interest
despite its inability to pass the test of reasonableness required by the Equal
Protection Clause.  See id. at 193.  He suggests that only a morality argument tied to
public welfare would pass constitutional muster.  See id.  Thus, if the gay liberation
movement is going to engage in the morality argument, it should note that any
morality it wishes to espouse should likewise be tied to the public welfare.  In the
context of “reparative” therapy, the public welfare would be health and safety, i.e.,
ensuring the mental and physical health and safety of children.
